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Abstract
Is federal Indian law dead? Despite a declining docket during the Rehnquist
Court, the Supreme Court continued to take a disproportionately high number of Indian
law cases – and deciding more than 75 percent of them against tribal interests. While
many scholars suggest that the Court’s conservative views drive these Indian law
decisions and criticize the Court for failing to follow foundational principles of federal
Indian law, this Article asserts that the Court’s reasons for granting certiorari and for
deciding against tribal interests in these cases are not Indian law-related. Instead, the
Court identifies important, unrelated constitutional concerns that appear to arise more
frequently in Indian law cases, decides those matters, and only then turns to the federal
Indian law questions. Once the Court disposes of the important constitutional concern in
its analysis, the Court’s federal Indian law analysis is secondary and often driven by
pragmatism. This Article concludes by arguing that advocates for tribal interests must
locate an important constitutional concern or a significant pragmatic consideration that
will drive the Court’s analysis before they will turn around the win-loss ratio.
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Leech Lake Ojibwe novelist David Treuer stirred up controversy in Indian
Country by declaring in his new book of literary criticism that “Native American fiction
does not exist.”1 The New York Times described the book as “a kind of manifesto, which
argues that Native American writing should be judged as literature, not as a cultural
artifact, or as a means of revealing the mystical or sociological core of Indian life to nonNatives.”2 Treuer uses the trickster story “Wenebozho and the Smartberries” – in which
the Anishinaabe trickster Wenebozho3 tricks a not-so-smart Indian guy into eating small,
dried turds by calling them “smartberries”4 – as the punch line to his argument focusing
on Turtle Mountain Band Chippewa writer Louise Erdrich:5
[I]f you insist on believing that Love Medicine is a cultural
document and that you can reach an understanding of its delicious magic
without looking at it as a literary production in relation to other literary
productions, and if you really want to use notions of desire instead of from
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knowledge as a way to make sense of it, then come with me, over here
next to the trail: I’ve got some smartberries for you to eat.6
Drawing from Treuer’s example, this Article posits that federal Indian law7 does
not exist. Or, to put it in a more accurate way, federal Indian law as practiced before the
United States Supreme Court is in serious decline 8 – and most likely has been so since
the ascension of Chief Justice Rehnquist in 19869 and the concomitant reduction of the
Supreme Court’s docket.10 And, as a corollary, much of the federal Indian law understood
as deriving from cases about Indians – cases that explored and defined the rights and
responsibilities of tribes and individual Indians, cases that could not have existed but for
some unique legal characteristic that only the presence of a tribal interest brought out – is
not really about Indians. Scholars and practitioners both believe that federal Indian law –

6
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7
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law cause of action for tribes and the United States to enforce the Trade and Intercourse Acts, 25 U.S.C. §
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common law that Indian tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
8
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9
See generally Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16
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See Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, The Decisional Significance of the Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 1665, 1672 (2006) (the “incredibly shrinking docket”); Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its
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same time, the docket appears to be shrinking even further. See Linda Greenhouse, Case of the Dwindling
Docket Mystifies the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at A1.
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to use Treuer’s phrasing – “is a cultural document and that you can reach an
understanding of i[t] … without looking at it as a [legal] production in relation to other
[legal] products….”11 What scholars and practitioners should do – even if they do not buy
the argument that federal Indian law no longer exists – is look at the last 20 years of
federal Indian law through a lens of assuming that the cases have nothing to do with
Indians or Indian tribes. Federal Indian law as the modern Supreme Court reads and
understands it begins to make more sense that way.
A critical premise of this Article is that the Court applies its decision making
discretion to decide the “important” constitutional concern first and then the Court
decides any remaining federal Indian law questions in order to reach a result consistent
with its decision on the important constitutional concern. Given that federal Indian law is
malleable (according to the way the Court reads Indian law) even in comparison to, for
example, the Court’s federalism or statutory interpretation jurisprudence, the
inconsistencies and seeming intellectual dishonesty in the Indian law side of the
decisionmaking is unsurprising.
This Article attempts a fresh look at the Court’s Indian cases from more of a
“positive rather than a normative analysis….”12 This Article’s goal is to give “systematic
attention to … implications for Supreme Court decisionmaking” in the context of federal
Indian law.13 The argument begins with a description of several classic Indian law cases
in Part I. Each of these cases represents a vital and dynamic part of Indian law – and form
a part of the core of the Indian law canon – but they can be read as something other than
11

TREUER, supra note __, at 68.
Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 32 (2005).
13
Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment – Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 66, 68 (2006). Professor Katyal’s paper on the strategies and preparations for litigating Hamdan v.
Rumseld before the Supreme Court should be mandatory reading for tribal attorneys.
12
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an Indian law case. In fact, each of these cases, while decided in reliance on Indian law
principles, includes a separate, independent reason – legal, historical, pragmatic, and so
on – for the outcome.
Part II introduces the current state of federal Indian law. Part II establishes that
the Court makes decisions in the Indian law field not through reliance upon a rule of law
or even through much reliance on precedent, but instead with reliance upon its view of
the way things “ought to be,” as Justice Scalia once wrote in an internal memorandum.14
The Court’s decisions reflect a “ruthless pragmatism” as a result of this view of Indian
law.15
Part III offers a fresh view of several of the Court’s most important Indian cases
by placing the Court’s Indian caseload in the context of its larger trends. The most
obvious trend is the severe decline in the Court’s docket. The decline in the caseload
should mean that most of the Court’s Indian cases are decided in order to resolve a split
in authority in the lower and state courts. But those splits in authority account for few
cases. Other Indian law cases reach the Court because they raise or involve questions of
important constitutional concern for the Court. It is a possibility that the declining docket
means that the Court will hear fewer and fewer (if any) cases on their Indian law-related
merits, but instead choose Indian law cases because they present an opportunity to opine
on an important constitutional concern outside of Indian law.
Part III offers a new look at the Indian cases with an emphasis on locating an
important constitutional concern unrelated to Indian law. A chart describing the Indian

14

David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in
Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (1996).
15
Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 460
(2005); see also id. at 436 (“ruthless pragmatism”).
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law and non-Indian law-related issues decided by the Court in each of the Indian law
decisions since 1986 reveals that a large majority of Indian law cases arguably are not
Indian law cases at all.
Part IV recommends that observers of federal Indian law begin to highlight the
“important” constitutional questions that may arise in future Indian law cases. This
Article does not recommend abandoning the quest for normative analyses and
conclusions about Indian law, but instead recommends incorporating a positive aspect to
the analysis. Part III concludes by applying the template to several cases rising through
the federal court system that the Court may agree to hear in the coming years. If nothing
else, identification of the important constitutional concerns involved in these cases will
aid tribal advocates in predicting the relative chances of success before the Court.
Where observers go wrong, this Article asserts, is by ignoring the Supreme
Court’s broader agenda, an agenda driven by its receding docket. This Article asserts that
the Supreme Court grants petitions for writ of certiorari not because the Court wants to
decide tribal interests or even to put Indians in their place. The Court does not care what
happens in Indian Country. To assume the Court does care is unwarranted; there is no
evidence whatsoever to suggest that the Court (as a whole) is invested in the concerns
and issues in Indian Country, which is as far from the minds of the elite legal
establishment as any issue can be.
What does interest the Court are constitutional questions of Congressional and
Executive power; broader federalism issues unrelated to the place of Indian tribes in the
federalism scheme; the legitimacy, sanctity, and authority of federal courts; and larger
issues related to race and social issues. There is significant evidence to support these
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assertions.16 These areas are now the significant areas of constitutional concern that
attracts the Court’s attention. The fact that these constitutional concerns arise in Indian
Country – both in modern times and throughout the Court’s history – often is accidental.
But these issues do appear to arise in Indian Country on a consistent basis. That federal
Indian law principles do not answer these broader questions is a significant reason why
the Court deviates from Indian law principles and even appears to denigrate them. When
tribal advocates recognize these broader constitutional concerns in advance of a
certiorari petition, then the advocacy before the Court on behalf of tribal interests will
improve, as will the win rate for tribal advocates.
To be fair to tribal advocates, in at least one recent case,17 counsel for tribal
interests did make an attempt to bring forth to the Court pragmatic reasons outside the
realm of federal Indian law justifying a decision in favor of tribal interests. This attempt
failed and for explainable reasons, but future litigants should use the strategy as a
template in future cases.

I.

A New Theory of Supreme Court Indian Law Decisionmaking
Consider the following fact patterns:
•

A court of the State of Georgia convicts an Indian man of murder and sentences
him to death. The crime took place outside the jurisdiction of the state – on an
Indian reservation. The defendant appeals to federal courts, seeking a writ habeas
corpus. The United States Supreme Court grants the petition and issues an order

16

See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J. L. & POL. 639,
663-65 (1993); Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis,
47 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 569, 585-86 (2003).
17
Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Wagnon, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005).
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staying the execution. The State of Georgia then executes the man two days
later.18 The Georgia legislature then passes a resolution asserting that the United
States Supreme Court does not posses authority to review the decisions of
Georgia state courts. The Court then agrees to hear a second case about the
concomitant issue relating to the Georgia legislature’s repeated attempts to nullify
treaties and other federal law.19
•

An Indian woman sues an Indian tribe in federal court seeking a declaration that
the tribal membership ordinance is a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Indian Civil Rights Act.20 The Supreme Court grants certiorari.21

•

A federal district court issues a final order enjoining the State of Washington and
its offers and agencies from interfering with Indians exercising fishing rights in
accordance with an Indian treaty. The Ninth Circuit affirms the order and the
Supreme Court denies certiorari. A state court then issues an order, later affirmed
by the state supreme court, enjoining the State and its officers from enforcing the
federal court order. The United States Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve
the split.22

•

Congress enacts a law prohibiting the harvesting of bald eagles. Anyone found in
possession of eagle parts will be in violation of the law and subject to time in jail.
Federal officers discover an Indian man in possession of bald eagle parts on an
Indian reservation, of which the defendant is a member. He is prosecuted and

18

See Georgia v. Tassels, 1 Dud. 229 (Ga. 1930).
See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
20
25 U.S.C. § 1302(8).
21
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
22
See Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979)
(Fishing Vessel).
19
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convicted in federal court. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the man
argues that he was exercising rights guaranteed to his tribe and its member in
accordance with an Indian treaty ratified long before the Congressional
prohibition.23
•

A federal court enjoins the State of Minnesota and its agencies and political
subdivisions from interfering with the off-reservation hunting, fishing, and
gathering rights of an Indian tribe. On appeal to the United State Supreme Court,
the State argues that the President had nullified the treaty by issuing an Executive
Order.24
The previous fact patterns are simplified versions of cases that the Supreme Court

has reviewed throughout American history. A quick review of the fact patterns would
compel the reader to believe that they are federal Indian law cases. And, with the
exception of the first part of the first fact pattern (a case made moot by the state), the
parties to the cases argued and briefed the cases as though they were Indian law cases.
Scholars who have critiqued and analyzed the cases have treated them as Indian law
cases.25 In fact, these cases appear in prominent fashion in the two major casebooks on
federal Indian law.26 These are classic cases that form a part of the backbone of federal
Indian law.
But it could be argued that none of these cases are federal Indian law cases.

23

See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (Mille Lacs).
25
See supra notes __ to __.
26
See ROBERT N. CLINTON, CAROLE E. GOLDBERG, AND REBECCA TSOSIE, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW:
NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 76-85 (rev. 4th ed. 2005) (Worcester); id. at 204-12 (Mille
Lacs); id. at 469-75 (Dion); id. at 482-89 (Martinez); id. at 1249-61 (Fishing Vessel); DAVID H. GETCHES,
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AND ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
112-21 (5th ed. 2005) (Worcester); id. at 323-39 (Dion); id. at 391-97 (Martinez); id. at 863-72 (Fishing
Vessel); id. at 880-88 (Mille Lacs).
24
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These cases highlight the possibility that federal Indian law does not exist and that
perhaps it is a mistake to think of these cases as Indian law cases. In the last twenty years
under the Rehnquist Court, for example, it is harder and harder to find Indian law
Supreme Court decisions relying upon foundational principles of Indian law, especially
those rooted in the Constitution. Such a conclusion should not be so surprising.
Prominent constitutional law scholars suggest that there is no such thing as principled
constitutional interpretation. For example, Professor Jed Rubenfeld wrote:
In constitutional law … there are no such overarching interpretive
precepts or protocols. There are no official interpretive rules at all. In any
given case raising an undecided constitutional question, nothing in any
current constitutional law stops a judge from relying on original intent, if
the judge wishes. But nothing stops a judge from ignoring original intent,
if a judge wishes. Or suppose a plaintiff comes to court asserting an
unwritten constitutional right. Under current case law, judges are fully
authorized to dismiss the right because the Constitution says nothing about
it. Another admissible option, however, is to uphold the right on
nontextual grounds. Evolving American values? Judges can consult them
or have nothing to do with them.27
Indian law scholars have been decrying the lack of principled decisionmaking about
federal Indian law for decades.28 Nothing stops the Court – no constitutional provision,
common law principle, or anything else – from working radical transformations of
27

JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 5 (2006).
E.g., Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609 (1979); John Petoskey, Indians and the
First Amendment, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 221 (Vine Deloria, Jr., ed.
1985).
28
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federal Indian law at any moment.29 The only constitutional provision mentioning Indian
tribes is the Indian Commerce Clause.30 As with the rest of constitutional interpretation,
there are no rules, except one – the Court looks for the familiar, a constitutional concern
that attracts its attention.31
The first fact pattern, based on Georgia v. Tassels

32

and Worcester v. Georgia,33

involved questions of federalism and the supremacy of federal law over conflicting state
laws.34 In that case, the State of Georgia issued a resolution proclaiming that the Supreme

29

Consider City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (2005), which redrew the
map relating to Indian land claims in a single instant. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d
266 (2nd Cir. 2005) (dismissing Indian land claims after 20 years of litigation by following the reasoning of
Sherrill); Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Wenona T. Singel, Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 TULSA
L. REV. 21 (2005).
30
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For more discussion of the background and possible limits of federal power
under the Indian Commerce Clause, please see United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 224-26 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107-08 (2005);
Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1; Clinton,
There is No Supremacy Clause, supra note __; Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL
L. REV. 1069 (2004).
31
Cf. Lawrence Lessig, How I Lost the Big One, LEGAL AFF., March/April 2004, at 57, 59.
32
1 Dud. 229 (Ga. 1830). For background material, please see TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY
OF REMOVAL: THE SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS 111-15
(2002); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 733-734 (red. ed. 1926).
33
31 U.S. 515 (1931). For wide-ranging scholarly commentary on this very important case, please see
RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND
POLITICAL LIBERTY 58-61 (1980); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
118-19 (1982); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS, 1789-1888, at 181-83 (1985); TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE
SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS 175-90 (2002); PETRA T.
SHATTUCK & JILL NORGREN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN A LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
SYSTEM 46-50 (1991) (Berg Publishers 1993); 1 WARREN, supra note __, at 754-61; G. EDWARD WHITE,
THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 731-37 (1988); DAVID E. WILKINS, & K.
TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 58-61
(2001); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW
AND PEACE, 1600-1800, at 132-33 (1999). Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics,
and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 521-25 (1969); William Walters, Review Essay: Preemption, Tribal
Sovereignty, and Worcester v. Georgia, 62 OR. L. REV. 127, 128-36, 139-41 (1983) (reviewing COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Rennard Strickland et al. eds. 1982) (hereinafter COHEN’S
HANDBOOK 1982 ED.).
34
See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559 (“The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to
be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the
Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making
treaties.”); id. at 561 (“[Georgia’s laws] interfere forcibly with the relations established between the United
States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our
constitution, are committed exclusively to the government of the union.”); CURRIE, supra note __, at 181-
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Court had no jurisdiction or authority to review the decisions of state courts.35 The case
arose in the larger national debate now known as the Nullification Crisis, where several
Southern states argued that they had the authority to nullify federal statutes.36 Chief
Justice Marshall believed these issues would arise in the 1832 Term in the form of a case
involving the Second Bank of the United States, a critical focal point of the states’ rights
debate, or the various attempts by states to declare the unconstitutionality of (or nullify)
federal law.37 Instead, these issues appeared in a case arising out of Indian Country. All
the necessary elements of the other cases were present for the Court to announce that
federal law was supreme over conflicting state law, the underlying important
constitutional concern.
The second fact pattern, probably the most famous, controversial, and important
opinion favoring tribal interests issued in the last 100 years – Santa Clara Pueblo v.

83; Burke, supra note __, at 512-13; Gerald N. Magliocca, The Cherokee Removal and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 53 DUKE L. J. 875, 905-06 (2003).
35
See 1 WARREN, supra note __, at 733-34.
36
For commentary and background on the Nullification Crisis, please see ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 42 (2nd ed. Sanford Levinson, ed.); R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME
COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 88 (1968); 1 WARREN, supra note __, at 770; David P. Currie, The
Constitution in Congress: The Public Lands, 1829-1861, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 783, 785 (2003); Michael J.
Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1136 (2001);
Edwin A. Miles, After John Marshall’s Decision: Worcester v. Georgia and the Nullification Crisis, 39 J.
SOUTHERN HIST. 519 (1973); H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution: A
Belated Review, 94 YALE L. J. 1285, 1292 (1985); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 945 (1985); Jill Norgren, Protection of What Rights They Have:
Original Principles of Federal Indian Law, 64 N. D. L. REV. 73, 110 (1988); R. Kent Newmyer, John
Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, and the Southern States’ Rights Tradition, 33 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV.
875, 876 (2000).
37
See DAVID LOTH, CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE GROWTH OF THE REPUBLIC 357 (1949) (“To
Marshall, the tariff issue seemed more dangerous to his principles. For the South . . . was not professing
itself willing to obey any protective tariff law.”); id. at 356 (quoting letter to his son; “This session of
Congress is indeed particularly interesting. The discussion on the tariff and on the Bank, especially, will, I
believe call forth an unusual display of talents.”); see also Richard P. Longaker, Andrew Jackson and the
Judiciary, 71 POL. SCI. Q. 341, 348 (1956) (“While the President saw the Indian problem as a temporary
one, the nullification issue presented a basic national crisis.”).
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Martinez 38 – is a mere statutory interpretation case about whether the Indian Civil Rights
Act may be read to imply a cause of action39 and to waive the sovereign immunity of a
sovereign.40 It is tempting to focus on the tribal sovereignty or sex discrimination aspects
of the case – and they are significant – but consider the underlying questions that
interested the Court: whether sovereign immunity is waived where a civil rights statute
does not have a specific cause of action to enforce those rights. Consider that if the Court
construed the Act as implying a cause of action and waiving tribal sovereign immunity,
such a precedent could be used against both federal and state sovereigns.
The third fact pattern, based on Washington v. Washington Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Association,41 included a major question relating to the
granting of full faith and credit of federal court orders in state courts,42 a question about

38

436 U.S. 49 (1978). For often intense commentary about the decision, see for example CATHARINE
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 63-69 (1987); Judith Resnik,
Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989);
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Gloria
Valencia-Weber, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Twenty Five Years of Disparate Cultural Visions, 14
KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 49 (2004-2005). For the point of view of a Santa Clara Pueblo woman, please see
Rina Swentzell, Testimony of a Santa Clara Pueblo Woman, 14 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 97 (2004-2005).
39
See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 60-61 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).
40
See id. at 58-59.
41
443 U.S 658 (1979). For commentary on the case, please see RUSSEL L. BARSH, THE WASHINGTON
FISHING RIGHTS CONTROVERSY: AN ECONOMIC CRITIQUE 77-103 (1979); FAY G. COHEN, TREATIES ON
TRIAL: THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY OVER NORTHWEST INDIAN FISHING RIGHTS (1986); CHARLES F.
WILKINSON, MESSAGES FROM FRANK’S LANDING: A STORY OF SALMON, TREATIES, AND THE INDIAN WAY
(2000).
42
See generally Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 669 n. 14 (“The impact of illegal regulation … and of illegal
exclusionary tactics by non-Indians … in large measure accounts for the decline of the Indian fisheries
during this century and renders that decline irrelevant to a determination of the fishing rights the Indians
assumed they were securing by initialing the treaties in the middle of the last century.”) (citing Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905)); id. at 672 n. 19 (“[T]he
reason for our recent grant of certiorari on the question remains because the state courts are—and, at least
since the State Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 86 Wash.2d 664, 548
P.2d 1058 (1976), have been—on record as interpreting the treaties involved differently from the federal
courts.”); id. at 673 (“When Fisheries was ordered by the state courts to abandon its attempt to promulgate
and enforce regulations in compliance with the federal court’s decree—and when the Game Department
simply refused to comply—the District Court entered a series of orders enabling it, with the aid of the
United States Attorney for the Western District of Washington and various federal law enforcement
agencies, directly to supervise those aspects of the State’s fisheries necessary to the preservation of treaty
fishing rights.”) (citing United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash.), aff’d, 573 F.2d
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the supremacy of federal law.43 This case can be seen as a rehash of Worcester. In this
case, the culmination of dozens of lawsuits and federal and state court decisions, the
Court was confronted with the fact that a state supreme court had interpreted a treaty in
ways that conflicted with federal court interpretations. Moreover, lower state courts and
state officials had a long history of violating federal court orders. Of course, this problem
implicated the Court’s supervisory responsibility.
The fourth fact pattern, based on United States v. Dion,44 is a question about
Congressional power to abrogate treaties with later-enacted legislation,45 not to mention
the serious national worry that Bald Eagles and other kinds of eagles were near extinction
at the time.46 The final fact pattern, based on Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa

1123 (9th Cir. 1978); id. at 674 (“Because of the widespread defiance of the District Court’s orders, this
litigation has assumed unusual significance. We granted certiorari in the state and federal cases to interpret
this important treaty provision and thereby to resolve the conflict between the state and federal courts
regarding what, if any, right the Indians have to a share of the fish, to address the implications of
international regulation of the fisheries in the area, and to remove any doubts about the federal court’s
power to enforce its orders.”) (citing Washington v. United States, 439 U.S. 909 (1978).
43
CONST. art. IV, § 1 (requiring state courts to give full faith and credit to each other’s decisions); CONST.
art. VI, ¶ 2 (Supremacy Clause); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (requiring state courts to give full faith and credit to
federal courts and vice versa).
44
476 U.S. 734 (1986). For commentary, please see Robert Laurence, The Abrogation of Indian Treaties by
Federal Statutes Protective of the Environment, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 859, 862-868 (1991); Robert J.
Miller, Speaking with Forked Tongues: Indian Treaties, Salmon, and the Endangered Species Act, 566-67
(1991); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Applicability of Federal Laws of General Application to Indian Tribes and
Reservation Indians, 26 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 93-95, 99-101 (1991).
45
See Dion, 476 U.S. at 738 (“It is long settled that ‘the provisions of an act of Congress, passed in the
exercise of its constitutional authority, … if clear and explicit, must be upheld by the courts, even in
contravention of express stipulations in an earlier treaty’ with a foreign power.”) (quoting Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720 (1893), and citing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 696 (1979)).
46
See United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he broad purpose of the Act
[was] to protect the bald eagle and prevent its extinction.”); Roberto Iraola, The Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act, 68 ALB. L. REV. 973, 974 n. 9 (2005) (citing Bald Eagle Protection Act, ch. 278, 54 Stat.
250 (1940)). See generally Dion, 476 U.S. at 740-44 (discussing legislative history of the statutes as
applied to Indians); Kevin J. Worthern, Eagle Feathers and Equality: Lessons on Religious Exemptions
from the Native American Experience, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 989, 1004 (2005) (“Just as the federal
government has a compelling interest in preventing the extinction of bald eagles and other endangered
species, it could well have a compelling interest in preserving endangered cultures, especially those whose
roots and current manifestations exist only in the United States.”).
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Indians,47 is a similar question about Executive power to abrogate treaties.48 The
constitutional concern in each case has little to do with tribal interests. The Court’s
interest was the extent of Congressional and Executive authority to abrogate treaties. The
fact that they were Indian treaties is all but irrelevant.
And these five cases are not exceptions. It is a distinct possibility that there are
fewer federal Indian law cases decided on the basis of federal Indian law principles over
the course of the history of federal Indian law than one would expect. Of course, while
those cases do appear to rely upon federal Indian law principles, what is becoming
clearer to Indian law scholars and tribal advocates with each passing Term is that Court
no longer applies a principled federal Indian law. In the last years of the Rehnquist Court,
the tendency began to appear as an acute trend.

II.

The Deplorable State of Federal Indian Law
The story begins with the wretched state of federal Indian law. Dean David

Getches reported in 2001 that tribal interests have lost over 70 percent of cases before the
Court for the fifteen Terms preceding his article and over 80 percent of cases in the ten
Terms preceding his article.49 One case upon which Dean Getches focused – Strate v. A-1

47

526 U.S. 172 (1999). For background and commentary, please see JAMES M. MCCLURKEN ET AL., FISH IN
THE GREAT LAKES, WILD RICE AND GAME IN ABUNDANCE: TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF MILLE LACS OJIBWE
HUNTING AND FISHING RIGHTS (2000); Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites
Cases: Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1102-03 (2005); Robert
Laurence, Antipodean Reflections on American Indian Law, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 533, 542-43
(2003); Harvard Law Review Association, State Sovereignty—Compatibility with Indian Treaty Rights, 113
HARV. L. REV. 389 (1999).
48
See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 188-89 (“‘The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either
from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.’”) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)); id. at 196 (citing El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525
U.S. 155, 167 (1999), a case describing means of interpreting foreign treaties).
49
Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note __, at 280.
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Contractors 50 – turned much of federal Indian law on its head.51 And that was before the
2000 Term in which tribal interests won one and lost three cases, two of which were
nothing short of devastating. These two cases, Nevada v. Hicks and Atkinson Trading,
shocked observers of federal Indian law in both the results and the “ruthless[ness]” of
their reasoning. If there was any doubt about the Court’s sympathies in relation to tribal
interests, the 2001 Term resolved those doubts with great clarity – tribal interests would
find no quarter in the Supreme Court. Others, such as Professor Alex Skibine, note that
the Court has decided 44 cases since 1988 following California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians,52 with 33 of the cases going against the tribal interests.53
The scholarship in the field of federal Indian law focuses on three foundational
principles: (1) Indian affairs are the exclusive province of the federal government;54 (2)
state authority does not extend into Indian Country;55 and (3) Indian tribes retain
significant inherent sovereign authority unless extinguished by Congress.56 These
foundational principles no longer (if they ever did) drive the Court’s federal Indian law.
The large majority of Indian law scholars have concluded that the recent federal Indian
law cases – in which tribal interests win perhaps one-quarter of the time, less than

50

520 U.S. 438 (1997).
For a description of the impact of Strate in Indian Country, see, for example, Sarah Krakoff, Undoing
Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177,
1216-1222 (2001); Skibine, The Court’s Use of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine, supra note __; Wambdi
Awanwicake Wastewin, Strate v. A-1 Contractors: Intrustion into the Sovereign Domain of Indian Nations,
74 N.D. L. REV. 711 (1998).
52
480 U.S. 202 (1987).
53
See Alex Tallchief Skibine, North Dakota Syposium article (2006).
54
COHEN’S HANDBOOK 2005 ED., supra note __, at 2 (“[T]he federal government has broad powers and
responsibilities in Indian affairs.”) (emphasis omitted).
55
Id. (“[S]tate authority in Indian affairs is limited.”) (emphasis omitted).
56
Id. (“[A]n Indian nation possesses in the first instance all of the powers of a sovereign state.”) (emphasis
omitted).
51
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convicted criminals57 – are an abomination, a derogation of tribal sovereignty and Indian
interests, and the worst form of judicial activism and assertions of judicial supremacy.58
Most observers of federal Indian law cases reach the conclusion that – in the words of an
Eighth Circuit judge who was reversed by the Court in a major Indian law case59 – the
Supreme Court makes up Indian law as it goes.60 Legal commentators struggle to reach a
conclusion as to what drives the Supreme Court’s recent Indian law jurisprudence, with
some commentators asserting that the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revolution” in favor
of states’ rights has seeped into federal Indian law.61 Others assert that the Court
disfavors minority rights and follows an “anti-anti-discrimination” pattern.62 Others argue
that the Supreme Court is engaged in a pattern of race discrimination against tribal
interests.63 Some assert that the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence is based on knee-jerk
reactions against the notion of a third type of sovereign government existing within the
57

See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Colorblind
Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 280-81 (2001) (“Tribal interests have lost about
77% of all the Indian cases decided by the Rehnquist Court in its fifteen terms, and 82% of the cases
decided by the Supreme Court in the last ten terms. This dismal track record stands in contrast to the record
tribal interests chalked up in the Burger years, when they won 58% of their Supreme Court cases. It would
be difficult to find a field of law or a type of litigant that fares worse than Indians do in the Rehnquist
Court. Convicted criminals achieved reversals in 36% of all cases that reached the Supreme Court in the
same period, compared to the tribes’ 23% success rate.”) (footnotes omitted).
58
For representative views from leading scholars, please see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED
WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA
(2005); Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 113
(2002); Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV.
431 (2005); Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court’s Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from
Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405 (2003).
59
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), rev’g, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
60
Oral Argument of Appellant, Prescott v. Little Six, Inc., 387 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544
U.S. 1032 (2005) (quoting Judge Wollman at 14:51 of oral argument – “[T]he Supreme Court sort of makes
it up as they go along.”).
61
E.g., Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note __, at 320-21, 329-30, 344; John P. LaVelle, Sanctioning
a Tyranny: The Diminishment of Ex parte Young, Expansion of Hans Immunity, and Denial of Indian
Rights in Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 31 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 787, 863-64 (1997). On the “federalism revolution,” see
generally MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249-78 (2005); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term: Foreword: We
the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 129 (2001) (coining the phrase).
62
E.g., Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note __, at 318-20. For an argument that the Court follows an
“anti-anti-discrimination agenda,” see RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY, supra note __, at 158-83.
63
E.g., WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON, supra note __; Singer, Canons of Conquest, supra note __.
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United States.64 Still other commentators argue that the foundational principles of federal
Indian law are so based in racism and stereotype as to have tainted all modern Indian law
decisions.65 Another vein of commentary deplores the inefficiencies resulting from the
Court’s apparent ad hoc decision making in the field.66 There is no shortage of criticism
of the Court’s apparent deviation from the foundational principles of federal Indian law
and of an apparent deviation from the Court’s role of protecting the Nation’s minorities
from the injustices perpetrated by federal, state, and local governments.67
An additional factor that makes these cases difficult for tribal advocates and
Indian law scholars to stomach is the consistent high rate at which the Supreme Court
grants petitions for writ of certiorari in cases featuring Indian tribes, tribal organizations,
and Indian interests. Since the advent of the “modern era” of federal Indian law in 1959,68
few Terms of the Court have passed without at least one major decision featuring tribal
interests. Many Terms feature several cases, in some as many as five.69 Even as Chief

64

E.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 43 (1987) (arguing that the Court decided one major Indian law case based
on its “visceral reaction” to the facts) (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
65
E.g., WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON, supra note __; Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous
Nation Sovereignty, 34 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 75 (2002); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian
Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L.
REV. 219.
66
E.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country, 53 FED. LAW.,
March/April 2005, at 38; Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note __, at 277-78; Andrew C. Mergen &
Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions in Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. COLO. L.
REV. 683, 744-45 (1997). See generally Joseph William Singer, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian
Law: The Conflict Between Critical and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1201 (1990).
67
E.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country in State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie,
35 TULSA L. J. 73, 101-02 (1999); Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note __, at 452-60;
Angela R. Riley, “Straight Stealing”: Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property Protection, 80
WASH. L. REV. 69, 118-19 (2005); Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s
Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 643 (2003). See generally Gloria Valencia-Weber,
Racial Equality: Old and New Strains and American Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333 (2004).
68
WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW, supra note __, at 1 (naming Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217 (1959), as the onset of the “modern era” of federal Indian law).
69
The 1997 Term, for example, featured five cases involving tribal interests. See South Dakota v. Yankton
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998); Montana v.
Crow Tribe of Indians, 523 U.S. 696 (1998); Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies,
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Justices Rehnquist and Roberts lead a Court that hears a smaller and smaller docket,70
tribal interests continue to be decided before the Court at the same rate.71 Coupling this
fact with the low win rate for tribal interests has compelled tribal advocates to avoid
appearing before the Court at all. A great victory for Indian Country in the 21st century
consists of convincing the Court not to grant certiorari.72
Since the 2000 Term, the Court has decided several other cases against tribal
interests. Three are of import for purposes of this Article – Inyo County v. Bishop
Paiute,73 Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Wagnon,74 and, perhaps the most important
and destabilizing decision in modern federal Indian law, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian
Nation.75 These cases exemplify the very recent degradation of the foundations of federal
Indian law by the Supreme Court, but they are mere extensions of a longer trend that can
be traced back to the appointment of Justice Rehnquist to the Court in 1971 and his

Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998); Cass County, Minn. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103
(1998). And the 2000 Term featured five cases involving tribal interests as well. See Department of Interior
v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001); C & L Enterprises v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S.
645 (2001); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
70
Compare The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 426 (2005) (noting that the Court decided 80 cases in
the 2004 Term), with Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 304 (1986) (noting that the Court decided
159 cases in the 1986 Term); see also Posner, supra note __, at 35 (“The number of decisions reviewable
by the Court is growing; the number of decisions reviewed by the Court is declining.”).
71
In the 2005 Term, the Court heard Arizona v. California, 126 S. Ct. 1543 (2006), and Wagnon v. Prairie
Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005). In the 2004 Term, the Court heard City of Sherrill, N.Y. v.
Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (2005), and Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631
(2005). In the 2003 Term, the Court heard South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 541 U.S.
95 (2004), and United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). In the 2002 Term, the Court heard Inyo County,
Cal. v. Pauite-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Indian Community of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701
(2003), United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003), and United States v. White Mountain Apache
Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
72
See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Means case a supreme affirmation of tribal sovereignty, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY, Oct. 20, 2006, at A3, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096413861.
73
538 U.S. 701 (2003).
74
126 S. Ct. 676 (2005).
75
544 U.S. 197 (2005).
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elevation to Chief Justice in 1986.76 While as Chief Justice, he did not write the lead
opinions in many Indian law decisions, the doctrinal origins of these cases can be traced
back to the damage done by then-Justice Rehnquist in the 1970s and early 1980s to
foundational principles of federal Indian law.77
Then-Justice Rehnquist’s Indian law jurisprudence stretches back to Moe v.
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Indian Reservation.78 In that
case, Justice Rehnquist rewrote the presumptions and the analytic framework to which
the Court had been faithful since the beginning of the modern era, Williams v. Lee.79
Justice Rehnquist’s Indian law cases reversed presumptions in favor of tribal immunities
to state regulation and taxation;80 replaced bright-line rules favoring tribal interests with
balancing tests favoring states and local governments;81 eliminated tribal criminal
jurisdiction over nonmembers;82 eviscerated tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers;83
and limited both the federal trust responsibility toward Indian tribes84 and the canons of
construing Indian treaties and statutes to the benefit of Indians and Indian tribes.85 ThenJustice Rehnquist efforts in this new Indian law jurisprudence did not appear to provide a
reasonable theory for the decisions or the departures from the hallowed foundational
principles of federal Indian law. Unfortunately, his attitude about Indians and Indian
peoples perhaps can be summed up in his solitary and pithy dissent in United States v.
76

See GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. TUSHNET, AND
PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW lxxiii (5th ed. 2005).
77
See generally BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note __, at 192-95; WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON,
supra note __, at 97-113; Johnson & Martinis, supra note __.
78
425 U.S. 463 (1976).
79
358 U.S. 217 (1959).
80
E.g., Moe, 425 U.S. at 475-83.
81
E.g., id.
82
See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
83
See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
84
E.g., United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700, 707-08 (1987); Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S.
110, 127-28 (1983).
85
E.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586-605 (1977).
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Sioux Nation,86 where he accused the majority of engaging in “revisionist history” by
asserting that the Sioux Indians were backstabbing savages.87
These cases formed a base that have made the Court’s federal Indian law
decisions since the ascension of Chief Justice Rehnquist easy cases for the Court, with
many of the most damaging cases being unanimous decisions.88 While some may now
question the Rehnquist Court’s success in its so-called “federalism revolution”89 and
other areas where it rolled back the jurisprudence of the Warren Court,90 there is a strong
argument that the Rehnquist Court did accomplish one very clear task – killing federal
Indian law.
This Part offers a description of federal Indian law as it once was and how it is
now after the end of the Rehnquist Court. These are two very different eras of federal
Indian law.
A.

Foundational Principles of Federal Indian Law

The true foundation of all of federal Indian law includes the treaties executed by
Indian tribes and the federal government, alongside the thousands of Acts of Congress
relating to Indians and Indian tribes and thousands of federal regulations promulgated by
federal agencies administering American Indian policy. In 1941, Felix and Lucy Cohen
collected the entire body of treaties, statutes, and regulations and reduced them into one
86

448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON, supra note
__, at 118-22.
87
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 437 (quoting SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON,
THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 539-40 (1965)).
88
E.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522
U.S. 520 (1998).
89
E.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, From States’ Rights Blues to Blue States’ Rights: Federalism after the
Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 800 (2006).
90
E.g., Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense- Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It
Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE
COUNTER- REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 62 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and
Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA L. J. 1 (1995).
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massive comprehensive treatise – the Handbook of Federal Indian Law, published by the
United States Department of Interior.91 The Handbook remains today the standard-bearer
for the collection of federal statutory and treaty law applicable to Indians and Indian
tribes, but it also remains the clearest source of the general principles and specific rules of
federal Indian law. The Handbook and its successors (with one notable exception92)
constitute one of the most successful treatises in American law.93
So much of federal Indian law is the federal law announced by the Supreme
Court.94 Much of the basis for federal Indian law derives from what Charles Wilkinson
called the Marshall Trilogy of cases95 – Johnson v. M’Intosh,96 Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,97 and Worcester v. Georgia.98 Chief Justice Marshall’s majority opinions in
Johnson and Worcester, alongside his lead opinion in Cherokee Nation, both declared
several critical and longstanding common law principles regarding the relationship
between the federal government, states, and Indian tribes and provided a template for

91

FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1942) (hereinafter COHEN, HANDBOOK 1942
ED.); see also Lucy Kramer Cohen, Felix Cohen and the Adoption of the IRA, in INDIAN SELF-RULE: FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 70, 70-72 (Kenneth R.
Philp, ed. 1986).
92
The 1958 edition was the product of Termination Era Department of Justice attorneys to revise the
Handbook – often without new or additional precedent – to reach conclusions opposite to (or limiting) the
original conclusions favoring tribal sovereignty and Indian rights. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Book Review, 54
U. COLO. L. REV. 121, 123-24 (1982) (reviewing COHEN’S HANDBOOK 1982 ED.); Ralph W. Johnson,
Indian Tribes and the Legal System, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1021, 1036-37 (1997).
93
The original edition (1942) has been cited by state and federal courts upwards of 200 times; the 1982
edition has been cited over 400 times; and the 2005 edition has already been cited at least ten times by
federal and state courts. The disgraced 1958 edition was cited over 100 times; however, many of these
citations were to inoffensive portions of the Handbook.
94
See CHARLES K. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
§ 107, at 313 (1922) (“These [constitutional provisions] leave untouched the general field of constitutional
power to deal with Indian affairs, and it has been necessary for the Supreme Court to build up here a very
considerable body of unwritten constitutional law.”; citing the Indian Commerce Clause and the Indians
Not Taxed Clauses).
95
WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW, supra note __, at 24.
96
21 U.S. 543 (1823).
97
30 U.S. 1 (1831).
98
31 U.S. 515 (1832).
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analyzing and interpreting the law in relation to disputes between the three sovereigns.99
The holdings of the cases, while significant, nonetheless are secondary to the reasoning
of the cases, as Justice Baldwin asserted in his Cherokee Nation concurrence.100
Johnson famously adopted the Doctrine of Discovery as the foundation for land
titles in the United States.101 The Court held that Indian tribes did not own the land upon
which they lived and used, but instead the European nations and their American
successors acquired fee simple title in the land by virtue of discovering the land.102 The
Court announced that Indian tribes did have the right of possession and use, a right that
could be extinguished only by the federal government through purchase or conquest.103
Johnson became the first instance of what the Court now calls “implicit divestiture,”104 or

99

See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. __, __
(2006).
100
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 32 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
101
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573. The case is a foundational case in most first-year property classes, appearing as
one of the first cases excerpted in property casebooks. E.g. JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY
S. ALEXANDER & MICHAEL H. SCHILL, PROPERTY 3-9 (6th ed. 2006); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY
__-__ (4th ed. __). See also JUAN F. PEREA, RICHARD DELGADO, ANGELA P. HARRIS & STEPHANIE M.
WILDMAN, RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 175-78 (2000).
102
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574. For background on whether the Doctrine of Discovery did confer fee title or a
mere preemption right prior to Johnson, please compare Miller with Robertson.
103
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574.
104
See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (defining “implicit divestiture” as “that part of
sovereignty which the Indian implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status”). For commentary on
“implicit divestiture,” please see Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over
Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1047, 1053-67 (2006); Bethany R. Berger, “Power
over this Unfortunate Race”: Race, Politics and Indian Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1957, 2046-49 (2004); N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate
Sources of Authority in Indian Country, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353, 371 (1994); Philip P. Frickey, A
Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: A Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over
Nonmembers, 109 YALE L. J. 1, 43-48 (1999); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 393437 n. 243 (1993); Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature
of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1160-64 (1990); David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural
Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1595-1617
(1996); Robert Laurence, The Dominant Society’s Judicial Reluctance to Allow Tribal Civil Law to Apply
to Non-Indians: Reservation Diminishment, Modern Demography ad the Indian Civil Rights Act, 30 U.
RICH. L. REV. 781, 800-05 (1996); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court’s Use of the Implicit Divestiture
Doctrine to Implement its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in Indian Country, 36 TULSA L.J. 267, 270-80
(2000).
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a finding by the Court that an aspect of tribal inherent sovereignty has been divested105 –
not by an express Act of Congress106 – but by implication through the lens of federal
policy and national necessity107 or, as the Court later stated, as a result of the dependency
of Indian tribes upon the federal government.108 Johnson recognized that history plays an
important role in contextualizing Indian cases.109
The second case in the Trilogy, Cherokee Nation,110 held that Indian tribes were
not “foreign nations” as used in the Constitution for purposes of the Court’s original
jurisdiction.111 The opinion held that Indian tribes did retain aspects of nationality and
created the label “domestic dependent nations” for Indian tribes, a label that sticks
today.112 The holding itself is very narrow, with Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion being
curt and somewhat conclusory.113 Only one other Justice joined his lead opinion. Critical
to the holding was the conclusion that Indian tribes are “dependent” on the United States,
a conclusion reached through an interpretation of the Cherokee Nation’s treaties where
they consented to be “dependent” upon the United States for military protection.114 Two

105
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the Bill of Rights.”) (emphasis added).
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Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2001) (quoting Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).
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Justices wrote stinging concurrences arguing that Indians and Indian tribes were too
degraded and insignificant to meet the international law definition of “nation” at all and
agreeing that Indian tribes were dependent.115 Justice Thompson, joined by Justice Story,
later added a dissent that argued for finding that Indian tribes such as the Cherokee
Nation are foreign nations, whether understood to be so by the Founders or not.116
Applying international law principles, the dissent argued that the Cherokee Nation did
not lose its status as a foreign nation by virtue of agreeing to be dependent on the United
States for military protection any more than (using a more contemporary analog) Monaco
or the Vatican loses its status as a nation by virtue of their military dependence on their
host countries.117
The final piece of the Trilogy is Worcester,118 where Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinion garnered a 5-1 majority holding that the laws of the State of Georgia do not
extend into Indian Country where they conflict with federal laws or Indian treaties.
Worcester laid the framework for analyzing disputes involving Indian tribes by looking
first and foremost to Indian treaties119 and then Acts of Congress.120 The opinion departed
from Cherokee Nation’s labeling of Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations” and
adopted the reasoning of the dissenters in Cherokee Nation, dropping the label “domestic
dependent nation” in favor of “distinct, independent political communities.”121 Of course,
Chief Justice Marshall retired a few years later and no later opinion adopted this phrase
or extended the reasoning. In the last few decades, the Court almost never cites Worcester
115
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for any proposition other than the undisputed tenet that it recognizes that tribes retain
some sovereignty.122 In the Court’s phrasing, it has long ago departed from the “platonic
notion” that state law has no force in Indian Country.123
Critical foundational principles of federal Indian law originated with the Trilogy.
First, Indian tribes and individual Indians did not own their traditional and aboriginal
territories in fee simple – the United States did.124 Second, federal authority in the field of
Indian affairs is both plenary (by virtue of Indian dependency) and exclusive (by virtue of
federal constitutional supremacy).125 Third, Indian tribes are nations and retain their
sovereign authority except as limited by the federal government.126 Other less significant
but important questions originated in the Trilogy as well. For one, the Court held that
Indian treaties must be interpreted as the Indians would have understood them.127 While
the Court is not always faithful to this canon of construction – even in the Trilogy128 – the
rule is an important part of federal Indian law and even extends to the interpretation of
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statutes enacted for the benefit of Indians or Indian tribes.129 For another, the Court’s
conclusions about tribal dependency and weakness provided the theoretical basis for the
special relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government, a relationship
often referred to as a trust relationship.130 According to the Court, tribal dependency
requires the government to treat Indians and tribes with special fairness and
consideration.131 While the Court often refused to condemn federal government actions
that appeared to violate this special trust relationship,132 the concept remains an important
part of federal Indian law and federal Indian policy to this day.133
B.

The Erosion of the Foundation

Much like the Contracts Clause jurisprudence of the Marshall Court,134 the
Marshall Court’s Indian law jurisprudence has eroded over time, although it took a much
longer time. The Court’s decisions of the past 20 years, in particular, have been at odds
with the foundational principles as articulated by the Marshall Court, but the Court has
not gone so far as to overrule any of the cases in the Trilogy.135 In fact, as some scholars
suggest, the Court appears to take the easy way out by simply ignoring those foundational
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cases.136 This recent jurisprudence appears sloppy, leading some scholars to suggest that
the Rehnquist Court was laden with animus toward Indians and tribes.137 As the Court
itself sometimes recognizes, its decisions in the field are contradictory or even
schizophrenic.138 The Court appears very uncomfortable and suspicious of Indian tribes
because the Constitution does not incorporate them into Our Federalism139 and, as a
result, the Court’s supervisory power over tribal courts is very limited.140 The Court also
appears very uncomfortable with federal plenary and exclusive power over Indian affairs
where the single provision in the Constitution that authorizes federal control only relates
to commerce with Indian tribes.141 As Professor Phil Frickey argues, the Court is
uncomfortable with being unable to reconcile federal Indian law with the rest of its
constitutional jurisprudence.142
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One can make a reasonable argument that the Court’s decisions in the field from
1832’s Worcester v. Georgia until 1959’s Williams v. Lee amounted to little more than an
interregnum where the Court announced very little federal Indian law. That period could
be best be characterized as a period in which an incredible, rich, and devastating history
of federal Indian policy landed on Indian people143 while the Court stood by and watched
like the house by the side of the road (as Ernie Harwell would say), citing to the political
question doctrine whenever a difficult Indian law question arose.144
But Williams offered a dramatic interruption of that period in a short opinion by
Justice Black that recognized the exclusive authority of tribal courts to adjudicate matters
arising out of Indian Country.145 The holding in Williams was consistent with the
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Trilogy’s foundational principles that state law did not extend into Indian Country and
that Indian tribes retain aspects of sovereignty not expressly divested by Congress.146 The
result helped to vitalize the development of tribal courts and tribal governments,147 a
development that continues today at an impressive rate.148
In the first part of the modern era from 1959 to about 1986, a time I have called
the “permissive modern era,”149 tribal interests were victorious before the Court in a large
majority of cases. Professor Alex Skibine estimated recently that tribal interests won just
under 60 percent of their cases before the Court during this time. While there were
significant losses later in the period, such as Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,150
Montana v. United States,151 and Washington v. Colville Confederated Tribes

152

(all of

which were driven by Justice Rehnquist), the Court abided by the Trilogy’s foundational
principles in large measure. The Court’s decisions in the area of taxation – cases such as
Central Machinery v. Arizona Tax Commission 153 and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
154

– recognized the general rule of tribal immunity from state taxation and recognized the

inherent sovereign authority of Indian tribes to tax those within their jurisdictions. United
States v. Wheeler cemented tribal criminal jurisdiction over tribal members in Indian
146
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Country.155 That case also reaffirmed that tribal governments are separate sovereigns.156
And Justice Marshall’s decision in National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. in 1985 provided a
framework for the eventual recognition of tribal court judgments in federal court.157
Several surprising, even disturbing, lines of cases followed the ascension of Chief
Justice Rehnquist in 1986. A superficial review of these decisions is helpful for now.
First, the Court began to reinterpret its 1981 decision, Montana v. United
States,158 to expand its meaning far beyond the very narrow fact situation presented in
that case.159 The Court’s decisions in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Reservation

160

and South Dakota v. Bourland

161

served to rewrite the

relationship between Indian tribes and nonmembers located within their territorial
jurisdiction by adopting a presumption that Indian tribes do not have jurisdiction over
nonmembers.162 This is the opposite of the meaning of the Worcester case. For some
commentators, Montana is now the foundational case for the current Court, overruling by
implication the Worcester decision.163 The Court now treats Montana as the criminal
jurisdiction parallel to Oliphant, creating the expectation that, sometime in the near
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future, the Court will adopt a bright-line rule eliminating civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers, just as it adopted a bright-line rule in Oliphant.164
A concomitant result of the expansion of Montana is the deterioration of the
adjudicatory jurisdiction of tribal courts that the Court is willing to recognize. In Strate v.
A-1 Contractors,165 perhaps the most damaging case of all the Rehnquist Court’s Indian
law decisions,166 the Court called Montana the “pathmarking” case in the field167 and
sharply limited the exceptions to the Montana rule168 – the so-called Montana 1 and
Montana 2 exceptions.169 Tribal advocates had presumed that the Court would invoke the
Montana 2 exception in cases where the clear focus of the case was in Indian Country,170
but instead the Strate Court all but defined the exceptions out of existence. The Court’s
decision in Strate came close to being the case that adopted a bright-line rule eliminating
tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, but the Court’s decision in Nevada v. Hicks 171
case even closer, with Justice Souter’s concurring opinion providing an argument that
tribal law is “unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out” as justification for adopting
the bright-line rule.172
Second, in Duro v. Reina,173 the Court attempted to expand its prohibition on
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, which it had already done in Oliphant,174 by
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holding that tribes cannot have criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.175
Congress quickly enacted the “Duro Fix,”176 but the doctrinal damage had been done.
Oliphant was the first case to utilize the doctrine of implicit divestiture since the
Trilogy.177 Each time the Court finds that an area of tribal sovereign authority has been
implicitly divested adds an amount of legitimacy to the doctrine by piling precedent on
top of creaky precedent. Ironically, one could argue that the “Duro Fix” itself served to
codify the practice, leaving the Court to believe that Congress acquiesces in the judicial
divestiture of tribal government authority unless it enacts legislation to reverse the
decisions.
Third, the Court declaring some Indian reservations disestablished, such as in
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe,178 or diminished, as in Hagen v. Utah,179 and
redefining the term “Indian Country” by making the astounding declaration that there was
no Indian Country in Alaska in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie.180 Part and parcel of
these cases was the severe devaluation of the canons of construction for Indian treaties
and statutes.181
174
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Fourth, the Court’s Indian taxation jurisprudence, based in part on a balancing test
developed in part by then-Justice Rehnquist in Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes,182 became a muddled mess as the Court, from the point of view of tribal interests,
interpreted any factor as against the tribal interests. In this area, the Court looks carefully
for hints that tribal interests are “marketing the exemption.”183 Whenever the Court sniffs
this intent, the tribal interests do not succeed.184
Fifth, the Court held in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation that equitable
defenses applied in cases where Indian tribes or the United States made claims related to
historical treaty rights or land dispossession.185 Since that decision, and a lower court
decision dismissing long-standing and powerful Indian land claims in New York state,186
almost every Indian treaty claim may be subject to dismissal on the basis of equitable
defenses. With one casual opinion in a tax case, the Court has changed the entire face of
federal Indian law, adopting a rule that it had been rejecting on a consistent basis for
several decades.187
In short, the last 20 years has seen the Rehnquist Court go out of its way to roll
back federal Indian law jurisprudence, a new jurisprudence that benefits states, local
governments, and private property owners that come into contact with tribal interests.
There has been no shortage of legal scholarship criticizing these cases.
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See 544 U.S. 197, 217-220 (2005).
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See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2022 (2006);
see also Shinneock Indian Nation v. New York, 2006 WL 3501099 (E.D. N.Y., Nov. 28, 2006).
187
E.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 253 n. 27 (1985).
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III.

Revisiting the Indian Law Canon – Since 1986
This Article offers an argument that perhaps it is now time to recognize that the

field of federal Indian law as argued before the Supreme Court is dead (but not
necessarily in lower federal courts, state or tribal courts, and in other venues). Traditional
scholarship and advocacy has failed to persuade the Court that its Indian cases should be
decided in a different way. Perhaps at one time, the Court agreed to hear Indian cases on
their own merits, but with the Court’s shrinking docket, that might no longer be the case.
This Article proposes to look at the Indian law decisions of the Rehnquist Court (and now
the Roberts Court) with an eye toward finding broader constitutional concerns that
interest the Court.
A.

The Shrinking Supreme Court Docket

Chief Justice Rehnquist’s leadership was almost without precedent in the history
of the Supreme Court. There can be no serious doubt that he brought a great deal of
stability and legitimacy to a Court shaken by the erratic leadership of Chief Justice
Burger. One of the salient features of the Rehnquist Court was the decline in the Court’s
docket. In the final Term of the Burger Court, the Court heard and decided 159 cases.188
By the end of the Rehnquist Court, the Court heard and decided only 78 cases in the 2004
Term.189
The Court’s smaller docket is loaded with cases required to resolve a split in
authority between jurisdictions, part of its oversight power over federal courts, and a few
significant constitutional law cases that attract the Court’s interest.190 According to Judge
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See Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 311 (1986).
See The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 430 (2005).
190
See generally Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005); Frederic
Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda – And the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2006).
189
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Posner, there tends to be one kind of case the Court now hears – “rule-imposing
decisions” in which the Court attempts to “tidy up a field by announcing a crisp rule or
standard.”191 Professor Schauer argues in turn that, while’s the Court’s ability to decide
cases as it chooses remains viable, the Court’s actual “agenda” (if it can be called that)
was far from “the public’s major issues of concern [and] the nation’s first-order policy
decisions….”192 While at one time, Judge Posner posits, when the lower courts decided
fewer cases, the Court could serve in a supervisory position over the lower courts,193 the
Court “has long emphasized that it is not in the business of correcting the errors of lower
courts….”194 Of course, these analyses beg the question – why does the Court grant
certiorari in the cases it does?
Most commentators and studies suggest that an important constitutional concern
drives the Court to vote to grant certiorari in many cases.195 Professors George and
Solimine’s study of the Court’s decisions to grant certiorari in cases decided by the
federal courts of appeals sitting en banc affirmed their hypothesis that a conservative
Supreme Court is more likely to hear liberal civil rights decisions by lower courts.196
Another study hypothesized and then concluded that “[b]ecause Congress cannot easily
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Posner, supra note __, at 37 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005), and United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005)).
192
Schauer, supra note __, at 32.
193
See Posner, supra note __, at 35.
194
Id. at 37.
195
E.g., H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
260 (1991); Tracey E. George & Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States
Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 197-98 (2001); Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal &
Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States Supreme Court: An Empirical
Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2002); Joseph Tanenhaus et al., The Supreme Court’s Certiorari
Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 111 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963). Cf.
LAURENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 156 (2006)
(discussing “issue salience”). Cf. SUPREME COURT RULE 10.
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See George & Solimine, supra note __, at 198 (“And our finding that the conservative Rehnquist Court
was much more likely to review liberal circuit rulings is consistent with the attitudinal model and with the
strategic account of high court agenda-setting.”).
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override constitutional decisions, the authors hypothesize that the justices will accept a
higher proportion of constitutional cases, as opposed to statutory ones….”197 The same
commentators believed that “[i]n the agenda-setting context, [the Court’s] strategizing
would take the form of opting out of a statutory mode and into a constitutional one, either
by (1) rejecting a petition that requires her to interpret a federal act, in favor of one that
raises constitutional questions; or (2) focusing on constitutional claims contained in a
petition, rather than on those of a statutory nature.”198 Moreover, the Court may be in a
position to “create constitutional rules that are extraordinary difficult, if not impossible,
for Congress to override” because of its certiorari power.199
What this seems to suggest is that the Court likely is not going to accept an appeal
on an Indian law matter unless there is a circuit split.200 It would seem that federal Indian
law on its own does not rise to the level of importance or significance – as defined by
legal and political elites – to justify taking up space on the Court’s docket. Even before
the Rehnquist Court began to limit the Court’s docket, the Justices famously denigrated
the importance (to them) of the Indian cases.201 Moreover, the unusual character of the
197

Epstein, Segal & Victor, supra note __, at 395.
Epstein, Segal & Victor, supra note __, at 408 (citing Kevin T. McGuire & Barbara Palmer, Issue
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id. at 359 (reporting that Justice Brennan referred to United States v. Antoine, 420 U.S. 194 (1977), as a
“chickenshit” case); PERRY, supra note __, at 262 (quoting a Supreme Court Justice: “The junior justices
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Indian cases – generating a significant amount of confusion amongst those who are not
experienced in the field – would seem to compel the Court to stay away.202 Finally, with
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor having been replaced by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, the personal interest in Indian law of those departed
“Westerners” would seem to portend a further decline in Indian law certiorari grants.203
In relative terms, these cases are rare and affect few people. Only about a quarter of law
schools even offer Indian Law as a class.204 Only a limited number of law professors
know enough about Indian law to be able to discuss the issues in the field with any
competence. Every Indian lawyer has an anecdote about a law professor dismissing an
Indian law case as being the exception to the rule not worth discussing.205
And yet the Court always accepts more Indian cases for review than the field
would appear to justify given the Court’s limited interest in Indian affairs.206 Perhaps this
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Cf. Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense: Toward a New Realism in Federal
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is explained by the fact that the Supreme Court’s opportunity to make law as a matter of
common law exists only in admiralty law and federal Indian law.207 If the Court’s current
caseload of about 80 cases holds in the Roberts Court, then if the Court accepts two
Indian law cases a year, 2.5 percent of its docket will continue to be Indian law-related.
In the 2006 Term, the Court has already accepted two cases.208 What attracts the Court to
federal Indian law?
B.

Broader Constitutional Concerns at Play

While the Court will grant certiorari to resolve circuit splits, those cases do not
cover the entirety of the Court’s Indian law caseload.209 This Article argues that most
Indian law cases reach the Court because there is an issue embedded in the case that
attracts the Court’s attention. This Article will refer to these issues as “constitutional
concerns.” This Article argues that while the Court may decide concomitant federal
Indian law issues as part of the overall decision, the constitutional concern is what drives
the Court, not the Indian law questions. As a result, because the constitutional concern is
far more important to the Court than the Indian law questions, the Court decides the
Indian law questions in line with the broader constitutional concern. Only after deciding
the constitutional concern does the Court turn to the remainder of the case – the Indian
law portion – that also must be decided. It is in these circumstances that the Indian law
207

Thanks to Joe Singer for raising this point.
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Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000). Two other cases, Dept. of Interior v. Klamath Water Users
Protective Assn., 532 U.S. 1 (2001), and South Florida Water Management Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004), while not an Indian law cases per se, involved tribal interests and should be
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doctrines, far less salient to the Court and therefore far more malleable, become more
confused and even, as Professor Frickey argued, “ruthlessly pragmatic.”210
All things must start at the beginning, so we first turn to the Marshall Trilogy.
Consider Worcester v. Georgia,211 the critical foundational case of federal Indian law
described at the beginning of this Article. Justice Breyer has spoken recently about this
case.212 Although Justice Breyer is one of few Justices to have visited Indian Country to
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Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note __, at 460; see also id. at 436 (“ruthless
pragmatism”).
211
31 U.S. 5154 (1832).
212
See Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections of a Junior Justice, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 7, 8-9 (2005); Stephen
Breyer, The Legal Profession and Public Service, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403, 413-14 (2000).
Justice Breyer’s remarks are worth reprinting here:
Consider an important case—one that is often forgotten in courses on constitutional
law—from 1832 called Worcester v. Georgia. There was a tribe of Indians, the
Cherokees, who, under a treaty with the United States, had land in northern Georgia.
Now, this tribe had given up hunting and fishing for better or for worse. They were
farmers, they had an alphabet, they even had a constitution. Unfortunately for them they
found gold. I say unfortunately because the Georgians then took the land. They simply
marched in and took it over. They paid no attention to the treaty. They did pay attention
to the gold.
Now as I said this particular tribe of Indians was pretty civilized. So what did
they do? They did what any civilized American would do; they hired a lawyer. The
lawyer was the best lawyer of his day, Willard Wirt, former Attorney General of the
United States, and he said, “We are going to bring a lawsuit and we are going to fight it
all the way to the Supreme Court.” In fact, they brought two.
In the first, called Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, they simply sued Georgia, and
the Supreme Court eventually found a reason not to hear it. The Court said this is a matter
beyond our capability. But then the Georgians passed a law making it a crime to go on
the Indian Reservation without the permission of the Georgia legislature. Some
missionaries did go on the reservation. A missionary called Worcester was arrested. He
was in jail and he brought a lawsuit, in habeas corpus or the equivalent, and said, “I
cannot be held here because this land belongs to the Indians, not the Georgians, so
Georgia law does not apply.” There was no way for the Supreme Court to avoid that.
Here is a person, he is held in prison, he says I am not held correctly under the law
because there is no law of Georgia that applies, and he asks the Court to order his release.
After a lot of procedural detail, which I will spare you, he got to the Court and the Court
decided the case. The Court held that he was right, the land belonged to the Indians. In
fact, the Court said the Georgians had no basis at all for being there. That is the end of the
matter. Release Worcester. Give the land back to the Indians.
The first thing the Georgia legislature did was pass a law that said anyone who
comes to Georgia to enforce this ruling of the Supreme Court will be hanged. Andrew
Jackson, President of the United States, supposedly said (and he said enough such things
that it is probably true): “John Marshall, the Chief Justice, has made his decision. Now let
him enforce it.” Nobody did a thing.
But then North Carolina, thinking this rather a good idea, said, “We will not
give the United States customs duties that we owe them because we prefer to keep them.”
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become more aware of the conditions on the ground,213 it is doubtful that he incorporated
Worcester into his public speeches for that reason. Worcester is not an Indian law case.
Before hearing Worcester, the State of Georgia had defied a Supreme Court order staying
the execution of a Cherokee man by the State for murder – they executed the man almost
as soon as they received the order staying the execution.214 Strong circumstantial
evidence supports the notion that the Court must have had Georgia’s defiance in mind
when they decided Worcester.215 In Worcester, Georgia had convicted four missionaries,
and sentenced them to several years of hard labor, for violating a state law that prohibited
white men from setting foot in Cherokee Nation territory.216 The law, part of a whole

Andrew Jackson woke up to the problem and he ended up saying to the governor of
Georgia, “You must release Worcester.” They had a negotiation and Worcester was let
out of jail.
But what about the land—the land that the Supreme Court of the United States
had said belongs to the Cherokees, not to the Georgians? The President sent troops to
Georgia. But did he send them to enforce the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United
States? No. He sent troops to evict the Indians. They walked along what is historically
known as the Trail of Tears, to Oklahoma, where their descendants live to this day.
Breyer, Reflections, supra, at 8-9.
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SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS 111-29 (2002); see also Georgia v. Tassel, 1 Dud. 229 (Ga.
1830).
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See Fletcher, Iron Cold, supra note __, at __. Cf. Breyer, Reflections, supra note __, at 9 (“The first
thing the Georgia legislature did was pass a law that said anyone who comes to Georgia to enforce this
ruling of the Supreme Court [Worcester] will be hanged. Andrew Jackson, President of the United States,
supposedly said (and he said enough such things that it is probably true): ‘John Marshall, the Chief Justice,
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series of laws aimed at destroying the Cherokee Nation as a viable political presence in
Georgia,217 violated federal treaties between the federal government and the Cherokee
Nation.218 The case had powerful implications for federal Indian law, but those concerns
were secondary to the broader constitutional concerns of the supremacy of federal law
over conflicting state law and the question of the enforceability of Supreme Court
mandates.
Compare Worcester to the previous case in the Marshall trilogy, decided only a
year before, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.219 In that case, one Member of the Court
argued that Indians were worthless savages and Indian tribes were not viable political
entities.220 Another Justice, following Chief Justice Marshall’s lead opinion, voted on
narrower grounds but agreed that Indians and Indian tribes were weak and dependent.221
The Marshall Court was badly fractured over the case, a function of the declining
influence of the aging Chief Justice and the increasing hostility toward federal authority
from the newer appointees to the Court.222 But a year later, because of the powerful and
dangerous potential of the State of Georgia’s defiance of federal law in Worcester, the
Court issued a dramatic reversal of its position on tribal interests.223 That reversal did not
derive from a newfound appreciation of the plight of the Cherokee Nation at all. Perhaps
that reversal happened because the Court began to understand the implications of state
217
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defiance of federal law that was beginning to happen in the South. Indian law scholars
and advocates take from Worcester that the Court had affirmed the separate character of
tribal sovereignty and the exclusion of state law from Indian Country, but perhaps the
bigger question was whether state legislatures could override federal law.224
This pattern – with the Court responding to broader constitutional concerns in its
Indian cases – began to recur with the advent of the modern era. Consider the following
quick survey of the Rehnquist Court’s decisions from the 1986 to 2005 Terms. The
holdings of the cases are stated in a manner that attempts to eliminate or reduce the
import of the federal Indian law questions presented in those cases. In all but a few cases,
it appears that there is a non-Indian law question sufficient to decide the case.
The following chart attempts to highlight the holdings or reasoning in each of the
Indian law cases decided by the Supreme Court since the 1986 Term began. If possible,
the “Indian law question” – a holding or analytical reason for a holding that is derived
from Indian law principles, statutes, or treaties – is separated from the “non-Indian law
question” – a holding or analytical reason for a holding that could be argued is not based
in Indian law principles, statutes, or treaties. In some cases, the non-Indian law question
may be based on a significant fact situation that is unrelated to Indian law that the Court
does not discuss in detail in its holding or reasoning, but which may nevertheless be a
driving factor behind the decision.
Indian Law Questions
Non-Indian Law Questions
Term Case
1986 Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. Holding that non-Indian (1) Rejecting claims from nonLaPlante,
(1987)

480

U.S.

9

defendants in tribal court
matters must exhaust all

224

Indian tribal court defendants that
principles of diversity jurisdiction –

See Breyer, Reflections, supra note __, at 9; Burke, supra note __, at 530; Gerald N. Magiococca,
Preemptive Opinions: The Secret History of Worcester v. Georgia and Dred Scott, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 487,
550 (2002); Rennard Strickland & William M. Strickland, A Tale of Two Marshalls: Reflections on Indian
Law and Policy, the Cherokee Cases, and the Cruel Irony of Supreme Court Victories, 47 OKLA. L. REV.
111, 116-17 (1994).
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tribal court remedies –
including appeals – before
they may challenge the tribal
court’s jurisdiction in federal
courts;225
California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians,
480 U.S. 202 (1987)

United States v. Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma, 480
U.S. 700 (1987)

(1) Holding that P.L. 280
does not authorize state to
enforce
civil/regulatory
bingo laws over Indian bingo
facilities;228
(2) Holding that federal
Indian
law
preemption
doctrine prevents state from
enforcing its bingo laws in
Indian Country;229
Holding that the federal
government’s
trust
responsibility does not create
tribal property rights;230

Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704 (1987)

None.

1987

Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass’n,
485 U.S. 439 (1988)

1988

Mississippi
Band
Choctaw
Indians

(1) Holding that the First
Amendment did not prohibit
the destruction of a tribal
sacred site by a federal
government
construction
project;233
(2)
Holding
that
the
American Indian Religious
Freedom Act did not create a
cause of action allowing
Indians or tribes to sue the
federal government;234
Holding that Indian Child
Welfare Act precludes state

of
v.

225

Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
Id. at 20.
227
Id. at 21 (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1977)).
228
Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. 202, 212 (1987).
229
Id. at 216-21.
230
Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700, 707-08 (1987).
231
Id. at 703-04.
232
Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 712-18 (1987).
233
Lyng, 485 U.S. 439, 447-48 (1988).
234
Id. at 455.
235
Id. at 451-52.
226
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local bias or incompetence –
counsel in favor of a non-tribal
forum;226
(2) Relying upon a policy of
requiring federal courts to “show
respect for courts of other
jurisdictions.”227
None.

Holding that damage to private
property rights from the federal
government’s exercise of its
navigational
servitude
over
riverbeds is not compensable under
the Fifth Amendment.231
Holding that a statute requiring the
escheat of fractionated interests in
Indian
lands
constitutes
an
unconstitutional taking of property
in
violation
of
the
Fifth
Amendment.232
Holding that the federal government
has the right as a property owner to
do what it wants with its own
property, regardless of an impact
upon religious practices of certain
citizens.235

Holding that Congress does not, in
general, intend for ambiguous

Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30
(1989)
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v.
New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163
(1989)

1989

1990

Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1992)
Wyoming v. United States,
492 U.S. 406 (1989)
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S.
676 (1990)

court jurisdiction where the
domicile of the Indian child
is Indian Country;236
(1) Holding that preemptive
effect of federal legislation
over state law in Indian
Country is governed by more
flexible approaches that
consider
tribal
but
that
sovereignty;238
federal law did not preempt
these state taxes of nonIndian business activities;239
(2) Holding that rules that
prevent multiple states from
taxing the same transaction
do not apply when one of the
sovereigns is an Indian
tribe;240
Holding that tribes do not
have zoning authority over
lands owned by nonIndians;243
None. Affirmed by an
equally divided Court.245
Holding that Indian tribes do
not have criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians.246

Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)

None.

Oklahoma

(1)

Tax

Holding

236

that

tribal

statutes to be interpreted
accordance with state law.237

in

(1)
Holding
that
the
intergovernmental
immunity
doctrine was no longer viable;241
(2) Holding that the due process
clause does not require that state
taxes be reasonably related to state
services provided to the taxpayer.242

Asserting via dicta that the power to
zone is critical to defining the
character of a community;244
None. Affirmed by an equally
divided Court.
Holding that there are limitations on
Congress’s ability to subject
American citizens to criminal
prosecution in jurisdictions that do
not provide American-style criminal
procedure protections.247
Holding
that
government
regulations that impact religious
practices are presumptively valid
under the First Amendment.248
Asserting in dicta that tribal
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238
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S 163, 176-77 (1989).
239
Id. at 186-87.
240
Id. at 188-89.
241
Id. at 174-76 (citing James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937)).
242
Id. at 189-91.
243
Brendale, 492 U.S. 408, 428-32 (1992) (plurality opinion) (White, J.).
244
Id. at 433-34 (Stevens, J.) (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 388 (1926)); see also
id. at 458 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1,
13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
245
Wyoming, 492 U.S. 406, 406 (1989). See generally Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier, supra
note __, at 1640-41 (discussing Justice O’Connor’s draft opinion, withdrawn when she recused herself
from the case).
246
Duro, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990). Congress overturned the result in Duro in 1991. See United States v.
Lara, 541 U.S. 193, __ (2004).
247
Id. at 693-94 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)).
248
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
237
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Commission v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian
Nation of Oklahoma, 498
U.S. 505 (1991)

Blatchford
v.
Native
Village of Noatak and
Circle Village, 501 U.S.
775 (1991)

1991

1992

County of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribes and
Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251
(1992)
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507
U.S. 99 (1993)
Oklahoma
Tax
Commission v. Sac & Fox
Nation, 508 U.S. 114
(1993)
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S.
182 (1993)

sovereign immunity is not
waived when a tribe sues,
seeking an injunction against
a state government action;249
(2) Holding that tribal
sovereign immunity does not
impermissibly burden state
taxation administration;250
(3) Holding that land held in
trust
by
the
federal
government for the benefit of
Indian tribes is reservation
land;251
(4) Holding that tribe must
assist the state in collecting
valid state taxes;252
Holding that 28 U.S.C. §
1362, authorizing Indian
tribes to bring suits in federal
courts, does not waive state
sovereign immunity;254
Holding that federal statute
removing restrictions on
alienation on certain Indian
lands renders the lands
taxable by states;257
Holding that the Kansas Act
conferred state jurisdiction
over criminal acts by Indians
in Kansas Indian Country;259
Holding that state taxes
within Indian Country are
presumably preempted by
federal or tribal law.261
Holding that the trust
relationship between the
federal government and
Indian tribes does not cabin

249

officials may be sued to recover
damages to the state.253

(1) Holding that state sovereign
immunity bars suits from foreign
sovereigns;255
(2) Holding that Congressional
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity must be clear and
express.256
Holding that repeals of statutes by
implication are not favored.258

Holding that the plain meaning of a
statute must be given effect.260
None.

Holding that the allocation of funds
from a lump-sum Congressional
appropriation is committed entirely
to agency discretion and is therefore

Citizen Band Potawatomi, 498 U.S. 505, 509-10 (1991).
Id. at 510.
251
Id. at 511.
252
Id. at 512-13.
253
Id. at 514 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
254
Blatchford, 501 U.S. 775, 783-85 (1991).
255
Id. at 780 (citing Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934)).
256
Id. at 786 (citing Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989)).
257
County of Yakima, 502 U.S. 251, 263 (1992).
258
Id. at 262 (citing Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)).
259
Negonsott, 507 U.S. 99, 106 (1993).
260
Id. at 104-06 (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982); Moskal v. United
States, 498 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990)).
261
Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 127 (1993).
250
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South Dakota v. Bourland,
508 U.S. 679 (1993)

1993

1994

the discretion of federal
agencies;262
Holding that Indian tribes do
not have authority to regulate
non-Indian activities on nonIndian owned lands;264

Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S.
399 (1993)

Holding
that
Congress
intended to diminish the
Uintah Indian Reservation;266

Department of Taxation
and Finance of New York
v. Milhelm Attea & Bros,
Inc., 512 U.S. 61 (1994)

Holding that states have
interest in enforcing their tax
schemes sufficient to require
tribes to assist in collection
of those taxes;269
Indian trader statute does not
preempt
state
tax
enforcement scheme.270
Holding that a categorical
rule applies denying state
authority to tax within Indian
Country;271

Oklahoma
Tax
Commission v. Chickasaw
Nation, 515 U.S. 450
(1995)

262

not subject to administrative
review.263
Holding that Congressional taking
of Indian lands, with a concomitant
delegation of agency authority to
administer that property, excluded
other sovereigns from regulating
those lands.265
(1) Holding that Congressional
intent in restoring lands to the
“public domain” extinguished the
previous federal use or purpose;267
(2) Holding that the Court will not
rely upon the views of subsequent
Congresses in order to determine
the intent of earlier Congressional
Acts.268
None.

(1) Holding that tax administration
requires predictability and not
“economic reality,” and adopting
legal incidence of tax as guiding
factor to apply;272
(2)
Affirming
“reasonable”
interpretation of state law by lower
federal court;273
(3) Holding that states may tax all
the income of its residents, even
income earned outside the state’s
jurisdiction;274
(4) Rejecting claim that employees
of one sovereign are exempt from
taxes of another sovereign.275

Lincoln, 508 U.S. 182, 194-95 (1993).
Id. at 192-94.
264
Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 687-89 (1993).
265
Id. at 689-90 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 460d).
266
Hagen, 510 U.S. 399, 410-21 (1994).
267
Id. at 412-13.
268
Id. at 420 (quoting United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963)).
269
Milhelm Attea, 512 U.S. 61, 73-74 (1994).
270
Id. at 77-78.
271
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995).
272
Id. at 459-60.
273
Id. at 461.
274
Id. at 462-63 (citing New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 312-13 (1937)).
275
Id. at 466 (citing Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 480 (1939)).
263
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1995

Seminole Tribe of Florida
of Florida v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996)

Holding that the Indian
Commerce Clause does not
authorize
Congress
to
abrogate state sovereign
immunity
in
federal
courts;276

1996

Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997)

None.

Babbitt v. Youpee, 519
U.S. 234 (1997)

None.

Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
520 U.S. 438 (1997)

Holding that Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 455
(1981), is “pathmarking”
case in federal Indian law;282

South Dakota v. Yankton
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329
(1998)

Holding that land surplus act
diminished
Indian
reservation;284

Alaska v. Native Village of
Venetie, 522 U.S. 520
(1998)

Holding that “dependent
Indian communities” does
not include lands owned by
Alaskan Native corporations
in accordance with the
Alaskan
Native
Claims
Settlement Act;286

1997

276

Holding that the doctrine of Ex
parte Young may not be used to sue
state officials;277
Congressional power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity must
derive from a constitutional power
that grants Congress the power to
abrogate.278
Holding that state officers may not
be sued under Ex parte Young
except in order to enjoin plainly
ultra vires under state law.279
(1) Holding that escheat provision
of Indian Land Consolidation Act
violates the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment;280
(2) dissenting Justice argued that
there was federal government
interest
in
“removing
legal
impediments to the productive
development of real estate.”281
Holding that a highway running
through an Indian reservation in
accordance with a federal easement
that is patrolled by state law
enforcement and maintained by the
state is not Indian land.283
Holding that the state had
jurisdiction to regulate a solid waste
landfill to the exclusion of both
tribal and federal environmental
regulatory authority;285
Holding that state construction
contractors building a school in the
village using state funds cannot be
taxed by other sovereigns.287

Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
Id. at 47.
278
Id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976)).
279
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1997) (citing Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-03 n. 11 (1984)).
280
Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 243-45 (1997).
281
Id. at 246 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 529 (1982)).
282
Strate, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
283
Id. at 450-56.
284
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 342 (1998).
285
Id. at 341.
286
Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998).
287
Cf. id. at 525.
277
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1998

Montana v. Crow Tribe of
Indians, 523 U.S. 696
(1998)
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma
v.
Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc., 523
U.S. 751 (1998)

None.

Holding that a nontaxpayer may not
sue for the refunds of another.288

Holding that tribal sovereign
immunity
extends
to
commercial activities outside
of Indian Country;289

Cass County, Minnesota v.
Leech Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians, 524
U.S. 103 (1998)
Amoco Production Co. v.
Southern Ute Indian Tribe,
526 U.S. 865 (1999)

Holding that when Congress
makes Indian law alienable,
that land becomes subject to
state and local taxation.292
None.

(1) Holding that a sovereign’s
immunity extends outside the
bounds of its territory and even
extends to the business activities of
the sovereign;290
(2) Both the majority and the dissent
expressed reservations as to whether
foreign sovereigns should have
immunity in outside jurisdictions
when
conducting
business
activities.291
None.

Arizona Department of
Revenue
v.
Blaze
Construction Co., Inc., 526
U.S. 32 (1999)

Rejecting application of
federal
Indian
law
preemption test to state tax
on
federal
government
contractor doing business in
Indian Country;294
Holding that treaty was not
intended by tribe to abrogate
off-reservation hunting and
fishing rights;296
None.

Minnesota v. Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians,
526 U.S. 172 (1999)

1999

Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S.
495 (2000)

Holding that, in federal land patents
to private landowners reserving
federal rights to coal under the
surface, the patents granted rights to
coal bed methane gas to the
patentees and was not reserved by
federal law;293
Upholding state taxation of federal
contractor
and
rejecting
intergovernmental
immunity
claim.295
Holding that no Act of Congress or
Constitutional provision authorized
President to abrogate treaty.297
Striking
down
voting
rules
benefiting Native Hawaiians that
violated
the
Fifteenth
Amendment.298

288
Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. 696, 713 (citing Furman Univ. v. Livingston, 136 S.E.2d 254, 256 (S.C. 1964);
Krauss Co. v. Develle, 110 So.2d 104, 106 (La. 1959); Kesbec, Inc. v. McGoldrick, 16 N.E.2d 288, 290
(N.Y. 1938)).
289
Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. 751, 754-61 (1998).
290
523 U.S. 751, 754-61 (1998).
291
See id. at 759-60 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983); Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605, 1607)); id. at 760-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 136 (1812)).
292
Cass County, 524 U.S. 103, 115 (1998).
293
Amoco Production, 526 U.S. 865, 874-80 (1999).
294
Blaze, 526 U.S. 32, 37 (1999).
295
Id. at 34-39 (following United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982)).
296
Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 196-200 (1999).
297
Id. at 188-95 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)).
298
Rice, 528 U.S. 495, 512-17 (2000) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
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2000

Department of Interior v.
Klamath
Water
Users
Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S.
1 (2001)

None.

C & L Enterprises v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma,
532 U.S. 411 (2001)

Holding that arbitration
award enforcement clause in
form construction contract is
sufficient to waive tribal
sovereign immunity from
suit;300
(1) Holding that tribal civil
authority over nonmembers
is invalid unless it meets one
of
the
two
Montana
exceptions;302
(2) Holding that nonmember
business’s enjoyment of
tribal governmental services
does not meet Montana
exceptions;303
None.

Atkinson Trading Co., Inc.
v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645
(2001)

Idaho v. United States, 533
U.S. 262 (2001)

Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S.
353 (2001)

2001

Chickasaw
Nation
v.
United States, 534 U.S. 84
(2001)

2002

United States v. White

Holding that tribal courts do
not have jurisdiction over
civil
rights
complaints
against state officers;307
Holding that Congress did
not intend to extend a tax
exemption to tribal gaming
operations;309
Holding that a federal statute

299

Holding that documents prepared in
anticipation of litigation that are
exchanged between an Indian tribe
and the federal government are not
exempted from the Freedom of
Information Act.299
Holding that form contract that
incorporates a state-law binding
arbitration provision operates to
waive a sovereign’s immunity.301
Holding that where state and tribal
public safety departments both
provide services to businesses, the
tribal sovereign is entitled to charge
for those services but may not have
general taxation authority over the
business or its constituents.304

(1)
Reaffirming
that
tribal
government ownership of lands is
critical to territorial jurisdiction;305
(2) Holding that Congress intended
to (and did) reserve interests in
submerged lands when it extended
statehood to the State of Idaho.306
Limiting state liability for civil
rights violations in order to protect
the
operations
of
state
governments.308
Holding that canons of interpreting
statutes do not trump the taxation
canon that tax exemptions are to be
clearly expressed by Congress.310
(1) Holding that a federal statute

Klamath Water Users, 532 U.S. 1, 8-16 (2001).
C & L Enters, 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001).
301
Id. at 418-23.
302
Atkinson Trading, 532 U.S. 645, 649-54 (2001) (citing United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 455, 465-66
(1981)).
303
Id. at 654-59.
304
Id. at 654-55 & nn. 6-8.
305
Idaho, 533 U.S. 262, 272 (2001) (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 455, 565-66 (1981); United
States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1 (1997); other citations omitted).
306
Id. at 272-81 (citing United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)).
307
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364-65 (2001).
308
Id. at 364-65 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S.
257, 263 (1879)).
309
Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. 84, __ (2001).
310
Id. at 95 (citing United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 354 (1988); Squire v. Capoeman, 351
U.S. 1, 6 (1956); United States Trust Co. v. Helverling, 307 U.S. 57, 60 (1939)).
300
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2003

2004

Mountain Apache Tribe,
537 U.S. 465 (2003)

mandated
compensation
from the federal government
for spoliation of tribal trust
property;311

United States v. Navajo
Nation, 537 U.S. 488
(2003)

Holding that a federal statute
did
not
mandate
compensation
from
the
federal
government
for
breach of fiduciary duty;314

Inyo County, Cal. v.
Paiute-Shoshone Indians of
the Bishop Community of
the Bishop Colony, 538
U.S. 701 (2003)
United States v. Lara, 541
U.S. 193 (2004)

None (leaving open the
question of whether the
tribe’s sovereign immunity
precluded
the
State’s
action317);
Holding that Congress may
ratchet up or down tribal
sovereignty;319

South Fla. Water Mgmt.
Dist. v. Seminole Tribe of
Fla., 541 U.S. 95 (2004)
Cherokee Nation of Okla.
v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631
(2005)

None
None

311

does not create a cause of action for
money damages against the
government unless it can fairly be
interpreted
as
mandating
compensation;312
(2) Holding that federal agency
liable when it allows spoliation of
trust property.313
(1) Holding that property interest
that is not under the control of
alleged trustee is not trust
property;315
(2) Holding that an agency head
with discretion to review an agency
determination may set aside or
modify
any
subordinate’s
decision.316
Holding that a sovereign may not be
a person as defined under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.318
Holding that Congressional power
in
Indian
affairs
is
a
“preconstitutional” power that is a
“necessary
concomitan[t]
of
sovereignty.”320
Holding that the Clean Water Act
reaches to point sources that do not
generate pollution.321
Holding that all federal contracts
obligations are enforceable where
there are sufficient appropriated
funds to cover the costs, necessary
to “provide a uniform interpretation
of similar language used in
comparable statutes, lest legal
uncertainty undermine contractors’
confidence that they will be paid,
and in turn increase the cost to the

White Mountain, 537 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2003).
Id. at 472-73 (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)).
313
Id. at 475-76 (citing Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport,
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 572 (1985); United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973)).
314
Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 506-11 (2003).
315
Id. at 506-08.
316
Id. at 513-14 (citing Michigan Citizens for Independent Press v. Thornburg, 868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir.),
aff’d by an equally divided Court, 493 U.S. 38 (1989) (per curiam)).
317
Inyo County, 538 U.S. 701, 712 (2003).
318
Id. at 709-12 (citing Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)).
319
Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199-207 (2004).
320
Id. at 201 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-22 (1936)).
321
South Fla. Water Management Dist., 541 U.S. 95, 104-05 (2004) (construing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)).
312
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City of Sherrill, N.Y. v.
Oneida Indian Nation of
N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (2005)

2005

Wagnon v. Prairie Band
Potawatomi Nation, 126 S.
Ct. 676 (2005)

Gonzales v. O Centro
Espiria Beneficiente Uniao
Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct.
1211 (2006) (“UDV”)

C.

Holding that claims to
“ancient” Indian sovereignty
are subject to equitable
defenses;323
Holding that federal Indian
law preemption test does not
apply to state taxes where
taxes are levied outside of
Indian Country;325

None.

Government of purchasing goods
and services.”322
Holding that land or boundary
claims for relief by one sovereign
against another may be barred by
equitable defenses.324
Holding that the tax liability of a
fuel distributor is incurred upon sale
or delivery of the fuel to the
distributor;326
Dissenters argued that the result
undermined the possibility of intersovereign
cooperative
tax
agreements to resolve these kinds of
disputes.327
Holding that federal prosecution of
persons using a hallucinogenic drug
as part of religious ceremonies was
prohibited
by the
Religious
Freedom Restoration Act.328

Preliminary Conclusions from the Survey

The previous survey may lead to some conclusions that might surprise observers
of federal Indian law. As would be true with any theory, it is impossible to prove with
any certainty what motivates the Justices in their voting preferences, but in all but a few
cases decided since 1986 that commentators label “federal Indian law” cases, there are
significant alternative holdings or reasons unrelated to federal Indian law principles that
could be used to justify the decision. Moreover, as the years advanced, it could be argued
that the Court decided the cases less and less on pure federal Indian law. Three of the six
Indian law decisions made in the 2003 to 2005 Terms have no Indian law issues

322

Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. 631, 644 (2005) (citing Franconia Associates v. United States, 536 U.S. 129,
142 (2002); United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 884-85 & n. 29 (1996) (plurality opinion); id. at
913 (Breyer, J., concurring); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934)).
323
City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. 197, __ (2005).
324
Id. at 218 (2005) (citing Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641, 651 (1973) (land); Massachusetts v. New
York, 271 U.S. 65, 95 (1926) (land); California v. Nevada, 447 U.S. 125, 131 (1980) (boundary)).
325
Wagnon, 126 S. Ct. 676, 688 (2005).
326
Id. at 684-85 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3408(a)).
327
See id. at 698-99.
328
UDV, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1225 (2006).
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whatsoever.329 In the last ten years, only one case arguably had no non-Indian law
components to it330 – and every other case (again, arguably) had a non-Indian law case
with an issue that might have been dispositive of the entire case. Take, for example,
United States v. Navajo Nation,331 a case vilified by commentators because the Court
ruled that an apparent arbitrary decision by the Secretary of Interior (in favor of a
personal friend’s client) was not precluded by federal statute.332 The Court’s decision
rested in part – and perhaps could have been the crux of the entire decision – on a
preference for deferring to administrative agencies.333 Or take Nevada v. Hicks,334 a case
ostensibly about the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts,335 could just as easily be
characterized as a decision vindicating the sovereign immunity of states and their officers
in foreign courts.336 Or Inyo County v. Bishop Paiute Community,337 a case about whether
tribal sovereign immunity can prevent a state government officer from raiding a tribal
casino facility to enforce a state civil law, turned on whether the tribe or any sovereign

329

See Gonzales v. O Centro Espiria Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006); Cherokee
Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005); South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla.,
541 U.S. 95 (2004).
330
See Cass County, Minnesota v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998).
331
537 U.S. 488 (2003).
332
E.g., Editorial, Supreme Court Deals a Win and a Lesson, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Mar. 14, 2003,
available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1047662515 (last visited January 23, 2007);
For a more nuanced view, see Raymond Cross, The Federal Trust Duty in an Age of Indian SelfDetermination: An Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 369, 390-97 (2003); Raymond Cross,
Reconsidering the Original Founding of Indian and Non-Indian America: Why a Second American
Founding Based on Principles of Deep Diversity is Needed, 25 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 61, 80-83
(2004).
333
See Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 513-14 (citing Michigan Citizens for Independent Press v. Thornburg,
868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir.), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 493 U.S. 38 (1989) (per curiam)).
334
533 U.S. 353 (2001).
335
See LaVelle, Outtakes, supra note __, at 759-76; Kimberly Radermacher, Case Comment,
Constitutional Law—Indian Law: The Ongoing Divestiture by the Supreme Court of Tribal Jurisdiction
over Nonmembers, On and Off the Reservation—Nevada v. Hicks, 78 N.D. L. REV. 125 (2002).
336
See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364-65 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); Tennessee v.
Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1879)).
337
538 U.S. 701 (2003).
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entity was a “person” under the meaning of federal civil rights statutes.338 Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band

339

is perhaps the clearest example of an Indian law dispute posing an

important constitutional question for the Court to decide. While the origins of the dispute
involved the treaty rights of the Mille Lacs Band,340 the important constitutional concern
that may have been more salient for the individual Justices voting preferences was the
question of whether the President can abrogate a treaty without express permission of
Congress.341 One could speculate that at least some or all of the five Justices that voted
for the Mille Lacs Band voted because they believed the President did not have authority
to unilaterally abrogate treaties – while not having a salient opinion on the treaty
interpretation questions that followed.
Much more empirical work is possible here, for example, to determine whether
the Court’s certiorari decisions are influenced by a non-Indian law-related constitutional
concern; whether lower federal and state courts follow this pattern; whether the apparent
pattern recurs further back in Supreme Court history; and, in general, to provide further
evidence on the claims made in this Article.
The purpose of the survey is to provide a means for discussing the possibility that
the Rehnquist Court’s decisions where tribal interests are at stake are not federal Indian
law decisions. This possibility is not so much as raised in the scholarship analyzing these
cases, with the glaring exceptions of Dean David Getches’ and Professor Phil Frickey’s
work.342 It is a distinct possibility that the Indian law principles discussed, analyzed, and
338

See id. at 709-12.
526 U.S. 172 (1999).
340
See id. ay 196-200.
341
See id. at 188-95 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)).
342
See generally Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note __ (arguing that the Supreme
Court is in the process of re-molding the foundational principles of federal Indian law to fit within general
public law); Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note __ (arguing that states’ rights, mainstream values,
339
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applied by the Court are no more than window dressing to the broader constitutional
concerns attracting the Court’s attention. If this is plausible, then the way Indian law
scholars and practitioners read and analyze the Court’s recent federal Indian law
decisions must be reexamined.

IV.

Identifying the Constitutional Concerns in Future Indian Cases
Lawrence Lessig’s compelling article, “How I Lost the Big One,” discussing his

advocacy before the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft,343 should offer important tips
to tribal advocates.344 Lessig lost the case but provided powerful insights into Supreme
Court litigation:
Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an extraordinary
lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had moved to, Jones,
Day, Reavis & Pogue. There were three key lawyers on the case from
Jones Day. Stewart was the first; then, Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer
became quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer had a common view about
how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly told me,
if we could make the issue seem “important” to the Supreme Court. It had
to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free speech and free
culture; otherwise, the justices would never vote against “the most
powerful media companies in the world.”345

and colorblind justice drive the Court’s Indian law decisions). Cf. RUBENFELD, supra note __, at __-__
(asserting than an “anti-anti-discrimination” principle drives the Court’s civil rights docket).
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Lessig’s mention of an “important” issue planted the seed, in many respects, for this
Article. Scholars had long scoured Supreme Court opinions, papers of the Justices, and
anecdotal evidence from Justices, clerks, and litigants to discover the “important” issues
that, first, make cases certworthy, and second, compel a member of the Court to vote in a
certain way. Lessig’s story is a reminder that the “important” issue sometimes is not
obvious unless we are willing to look in a different direction at the same questions. Indian
law advocates need to do the same thing.
Further consider Professor Lessig’s review of the opinion in his case:
I first scoured the majority opinion, written by Ginsburg, looking for how
the court would distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
Lopez. The reasoning was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
cited. The core argument of our case did not even appear in the court’s
opinion. I couldn’t quite believe what I was reading. I had said that there
was no way this court could reconcile limited powers with the commerce
clause and unlimited powers with the progress clause. It had never even
occurred to me that they could reconcile the two by not addressing the
argument at all.346
Lessig’s review of his own case sounds terrifyingly familiar to tribal advocates reading
their own cases. Critical arguments made by tribal interests that may have had powerful
sway with lower court judges sometimes go nowhere with Supreme Court Justices – and
are simply ignored.
Tribal advocates are starting to learn the game, but sometimes there’s just not
enough to work with. For example, early in the 2005 Term, the Supreme Court heard
346

Id. at 62.
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arguments in Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation,347 a dispute between the
Nation and the State of Kansas over whether Kansas’s motor fuel tax on retailers – which
was paid by the Nation when the retailers passed the tax through to their customers – was
preempted by federal law and tribal sovereignty.348 Justice Souter asked the first question
in both the state and tribal arguments – effectively contextualizing the case – of whether
the tribe was acting as a government or as a business.349 In fact, the Nation made a
powerful argument that every dollar of a tax it intended to collect once the state tax was
lifted would go toward highway repairs and maintenance – a governmental function.350
The Court all but ignored that argument, refusing to apply the preemption test at all.351 In
essence, the Court refused to even apply federal Indian law principles on the theory that
the state levied the tax outside of Indian Country.352 Indian law didn’t even apply in
Wagnon.
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126 S. Ct. 676 (2005).
Wagnon, 126 S. Ct. at 680-81.
349
See Oral argument at 4, Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005) (No. 04-631)
(Justice Souter: “My question is, Do we know, from the record, whether the tax that is assessed on the
distributor is, in fact, passed through to the tribe so that, in economic effect, the tribe is collecting, via passthrough, the State tax and imposing its own tax and still selling at market prices?”); id. at 25 (Justice
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studied ignorance of the Tribe’s sovereign interest in taxation to support its infrastructure is ironic at best,
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entirety.”); Wagnon, 126 S. Ct. at 698 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In sum, the Nation operates the Nation
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will effectively nullify the Nation’s tax, which funds critical reservation road-building programs, endeavors
not aided by state funds. I resist that unbalanced judgment.”).
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See Wagnon, 126 S. Ct. at 688 (refusing to apply the preemption test); id. at 689 (refusing to consider to
roads argument).
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See Wagnon, 126 S. Ct. at 688 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973)).
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What concern did the Court have when it decided Wagnon? One possibility was
that the Court was worried that the states and the federal government might adapt the
Nation’s theory for their own purposes. In critiquing the Nation’s arguments, the Court
appeared to imply that these federal Indian law principles might translate to state and
federal tax questions.353 Perhaps the Court was worried that states would demand a
refund for money they paid in accordance with government contracts to construction
contractors based out of state where that money could be traced to another state’s taxation
(a circumstance that occurs with regularity in tribal construction354). Regardless, what is
clear from Wagnon is that there was no important constitutional concern supporting the
tribal interests, nor were there significant pragmatic reasons to vote for the Prairie Band.
Tribal advocates are at a serious disadvantage in constitutional litigation before
the Supreme Court. As Justice Thomas pointed out, there is nothing in the constitution
that reserves tribal sovereignty.355 While this might be the equivalent of Justice Black
refusing to vote for mandatory busing of public schools in order to implement
desegregation orders because the word “bus” doesn’t appear in the Constitution,356
Justice Thomas raised an important question that the Constitution does not answer. Since
the Constitution does not assist tribal interests as much as, for example, the Tenth
Amendment assists states,357 tribal interests may have to look to other, more pragmatic
concerns and consequences that will persuade the Court. Tribal advocates in the Wagnon
case did attempt to persuade the Court with identifying considerable consequences that
353

See Wagnon, 126 S. Ct. at 685-86 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 1; North American Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 386
U.S. 417, 424 (1932)).
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See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, The Power to Destroy, and the Michigan Tribal-State
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would arise from a ruling in favor of the State of Kansas, but these concerns did not
persuade the Court in that instance.
This Part discusses four areas of federal Indian law that are strong candidates for
Supreme Court review – and suggestions for identifying important constitutional
concerns – or considerable pragmatic concerns – that will both compel a grant of
certiorari and garner enough votes to win a case here and there.
A.

Tribal Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers
1.

Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction

One area of difficulty for tribal advocates will be the area of tribal criminal
jurisdiction. As the following discussion shows, there are several constitutional concerns
that weigh against tribal interests, but there may be some room to persuade the Court that
tribal criminal jurisdiction is important for pragmatic reasons.
The Supreme Court recently decided not to hear Means v. Navajo Nation 358 and a
companion case, Morris v. Tanner,359 impressive victories for tribal advocates. Means, a
member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, faces prosecution before the Navajo tribal courts for
allegedly assaulting his family members.360 He had argued that the Navajo Nation could
not have jurisdiction over him because he was not a member of that tribe – he was a
nonmember Indian.361 In 1990, Means’ attorney, John Trebon, had successfully argued
before the Supreme Court that Indian tribes cannot prosecute nonmember Indians in Duro
v. Reina
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and was attempting to re-establish that rule by asking the Court to strike
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432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 381 (2006) (hereinafter Means II).
No. 03-35922, 160 Fed. Appx. 600 (9th Cir., Dec. 22, 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 379 (2006).
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See Means v. District Court of the Chinle Judicial District, No. SC-CV-61-98, VersusLaw No.
1999.NANN.0000013, at ¶ 21 (Navajo Nation Supreme Court, May 11, 1999), available at
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362
495 U.S. 676 (1990).
359

59

down the “Duro Fix,” upheld in United States v. Lara in a 7-2 decision.363 Lara seemed
to answer the question of whether tribes could prosecute nonmember Indians, but two of
the seven Justices in the majority – Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor – are
no longer on the Court. And, of the remaining five members in the majority, one of them
– Justices Kennedy – said that under a different procedural posturing (an appeal of the
tribal court conviction), they might have voted to strike down the Duro Fix.364 Justice
Thomas stated that he’s waiting for the Court to come to its senses in the entire body of
federal Indian law and is willing to reopen federal Indian law principles that have been
settled for centuries.365 Both the Means and the Morris cases were appeals of tribal court
convictions. That left only three Justices in the majority, with new Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito the remaining uncertain votes. In short, a 7-2 Lara decision could have
turned into a 6-3 decision the other way. But the Court denied the petition for writ of
certiorari.366
Counsel for Means and Morris could not have expected to win any of their
appeals in the tribal courts and lower federal courts because of the decisiveness of the
363

541 U.S. 193 (2004).
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willing to revisit the question. Cf., e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); id., at 584-593 (THOMAS, J., concurring).”).
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recent Lara decision. But they brought the cases in a manner strategically designed to
attract the Court’s attention, gambling that the Court was willing to entertain a challenge
to the Duro Fix – and all tribal court prosecutions – because Indian tribes are not required
by federal statute to appoint counsel for indigent defendants.367 Justice Breyer’s majority
opinion in Lara seemed to keep the question open.368 Moreover, nonmembers Indians are
unlikely to be able to vote in tribal elections or are not eligible to sit on tribal court
juries.369 Justice Kennedy, the force behind Duro v. Reina,370 was particularly concerned
about tribes that prosecute people without providing these criminal process rights.371
Even if the Court does not acknowledge an important constitutional concern
favoring tribal interests, important and significant pragmatic concerns are present in these
types of cases. Intermarriage between tribes and increased tribal employment
opportunities are longstanding facts in most tribal communities, guaranteeing the
presence of a significant population of nonmember Indians on most reservations.372
Taking away federal recognition of and respect for the convictions of nonmember Indians
– like the Court did in Duro – created a significant loophole in tribal law enforcement
367

See 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
See Lara, 541 U.S. at 207-08.
369
Cf. Lara, 541 U.S. 208-09 (rejecting Lara’s due process and equal protection arguments).
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495 U.S. 676 (1990); see also Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 1976) (Kennedy, C.J.,
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nom., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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See Lara, 541 U.S. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Constitution is based on a theory of original,
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See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The Impact of Law on Indian
Group Life, 28 LAW & SOC. REV. 1123, 1143-44 (1994); Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal
Self-Governance, 80 N.D. L. REV. 691, 714-15 (2004).
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that even a lumbering bear like Congress understood needed quick corrective action.373
The consequences of creating yet another loophole in the tribal-federal-state law
enforcement jurisdictional scheme in Indian Country (sometimes referred to as a
“maze,”374) – the first major loophole being the refusal of the Court to recognize tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe375 – could
be significant to Indian Country. If tribal advocates can provide empirical research that
shows there was an increase in crime (both qualitatively and quantitatively) by nonIndians after Oliphant,376 it might persuade a law-and-order Justice that the constitutional
concerns are not dispositive.
Of course, Indian tribes are not states or the federal government.377 State and
federal law enforcement come from a long history and practice of coercing confessions
from suspects378 (one of the reasons to guarantee an attorney and a jury of peers379) that is
missing from most tribes. In fact, the conviction rate in federal courts is astronomically
high because Indian defendants are far more likely to confess to crimes, a result (it is
said) of the Indian tradition to admit mistakes in order to allow community healing to
373
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begin.380 Moreover, Indian tribes often do not have the resources to fund a public
defender system;381 but neither do tribal courts sentence the guilty to jail as a matter of
course.382
There were reasons why the Court didn’t agree to hear the Means and Morris
cases. First, the Court doesn’t like to reverse a 7-2 decision so quickly after announcing
it. With the recent turnover on the Court, quick reversals makes the Court look too much
like a political body, subject to the political whims of its members.383 Second, neither the
Means nor the Morris case met the list of due process factors that concerns Justice
Kennedy. Both defendants were not indigent and were represented by counsel in tribal
court.384 And Navajo law even provides for nonmember Indians like Means to participate
in tribal politics (which he did) and even sit on juries (he refused to register).385 But the
next case in the pipeline to the Court might include those factors.
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What tribal advocates and policymakers should now be on the lookout for are
appeals of tribal court convictions of nonmember Indians who are indigent,
unrepresented, cannot sit on tribal court juries, and who are sentenced to even a single
day of jail. Russell Means arguably now faces the justice of the Navajo Nation because
he didn’t meet those requirements. Forward-looking tribes are thinking about funding
public defender offices and appointed counsel procedures and adopting rules that allow
for criminal trial juries to include defendants’ peers. And they are wise to do so.
2.

Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers

In this area, there is not the same importance to the Court’s constitutional
concerns as there is in the criminal jurisdiction area, but the same questions are present.
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Nevada v. Hicks held that tribal courts do not
have jurisdiction over federal civil rights claims by tribal members against state officers
for actions that occurred in Indian Country.386 However, the opinion acknowledged an
open question – “We leave open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember
defendants in general.”387 In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter raised several questions
as to whether tribal courts should ever have jurisdiction over nonmember defendants.388
Justice Souter’s opinion suggests that at least some members of the Court worry that
subjecting nonmembers to the processes and laws of Indian tribes might be a violation of
due process.389 There seems to be a worry that tribal laws are “unusually difficult for an
outsider to sort out.”390 As a response, Indian law scholars have critiqued the very notion
of implicit divestiture, arguing that the Court’s authority in the area is questionable and
386
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Hicks, 533 U.S. at 385.
387

64

flawed.391 Others argue that respect for tribal sovereignty should compel the Court to
recognize tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers.392 Still others have argued that the
tribal law that might be confusing to an outsider never applies to outsiders and that tribal
courts apply Anglo-American law to nonmembers.393
At one point, the Court acknowledged a concern that divesting tribal courts of
jurisdiction would be detrimental to tribal self-government and the development of tribal
institutions,394 but the Court does not appear to be concerned with these questions any
longer. Tribal advocates should develop pragmatic reasons that would persuade the Court
that preserving tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers is important.
B.

Federal Statutes of General Applicability

Another area of difficulty is the question of whether federal laws that do not state
on their face that they apply to Indian tribes actually do apply to Indian tribes.395 Federal
employment rights statutes such as the Fair Labor Standards Act396 and the National
Labor Relations Act397 are silent as to whether they apply to Indian tribes as employers.
Other federal statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,398 explicitly
exclude Indian tribes while others, such as certain criminal399 and environmental400
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statutes, explicitly include Indian tribes. The federal circuit courts of appeal have adopted
differing – and one could argue, conflicting – common law tests to determine whether or
not the federal statute of general applicability will apply.401
Whether the Court – assuming it agrees to hear a case in this area (it has not done
so yet) – decides that a federal statute of general applicability will apply to Indian tribes
most likely will depend far more on the federal policy annunciated by Congress in the
statute than on foundational principles of tribal sovereignty. Consider a D.C. Circuit case,
San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. National Labor Relations Board,402 for example.
Tribal advocates have argued forcefully that foundational principles of tribal sovereignty
and federal Indian law compel the court to find that the National Labor Relations Act
does not apply to Indian tribes or their business interests.403 But the case may come down
to non-Indian law principles: first, whether Congress originally intended the Act to apply
to tribal businesses in 1935;404 and, second, if not, whether the Act’s scope can change
over decades to encompass the relatively recent phenomenon of successful tribal business
operations employing numerous nonmembers. The second issue, even if the D.C. Circuit
does not reach it, might become an important constitutional reason for the Court to grant
certiorari in an appeal from either side.
C.

Tenth Amendment

A recent addition to the field of federal Indian law is the Tenth Amendment. Long
considered to be part of the recognition of the historical fact that the states have little or
400
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no stake in the federal-tribal relationship,405 the Rehnquist Court’s buttressing of states’
rights appears to have emboldened states’ claims based on the Tenth Amendment against
tribal interests in recent years.406 There are two major areas in which the states are
making Tenth Amendment claims. First, states are arguing that the Department of
Interior’s authority to take land into trust for the benefit of Indian tribes – and the
concomitant immunity from state tax and regulatory authority – violates states’ reserved
rights under the Tenth Amendment.407 Second, in one state supreme court, tribal political
activities that appear to interfere with state political activities have triggered the Tenth
Amendment in a manner sufficient to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.408 The question
that the Court could decide soon is whether the Tenth Amendment is important enough to
limit certain exercises of tribal sovereignty.
D.

Indian Land Claims

One final area worth discussing here is the question of longstanding Indian land
claims. Here, the Court appears to recognize no constitutional concerns that weigh in
favor of Indian tribes, but there are significant pragmatic concerns. The Court is very
worried that Indian land claims and other claims to sovereignty with upset the “settled
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expectations” of private landowners and state and local governments.409 But, if there are
significant constitutional concerns, they are property rights that should favor of the tribal
and federal interests.410 However, these cases are examples of where pragmatic concerns
appear to trump any constitutional concerns.
In 2005’s City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation,411 the Supreme Court rewrote
the rules on “ancient” tribal claims to sovereignty by allowing – for the first time in
recent memory and with the last time benefiting private property owners412 – states and
local governments opposing tribal sovereignty and Indian tribes to raise equitable
defenses.413 In other words, the Court held that the Nation (and the United States) waited
too long to bring their claims.414 Although City of Sherrill did not adjudicate an Indian
land claim (it had already been settled),415 the Second Circuit relied upon the decision as
the basis for dismissing land claims in Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki,416 claims valued
at hundreds of millions of dollars.417 The State of New York and its subdivisions now
argue in every land claims pleading that too much time has passed to restore tribal
sovereignty and Indian lands.418 It seems certain that tribes bringing land claims and other
long-standing claims to sovereignty must traverse this new (and hostile) world of
equitable defenses in order to prevail. The very notion of an Indian land claim may soon

409

City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 218 (2005).
Cf. Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1998); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
411
544 U.S. 197 (2005).
412
The last time was Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317 (1892).
413
See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213-14.
414
See id. at 217-19.
415
See id. at 202.
416
413 F.3d 266 (2nd Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2022 (2006).
417
See id. at 268 ($248 million).
418
And with success. See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, 2006 WL 3501099 (E.D. N.Y., Nov. 28,
2006).
410

68

disappear. States and local governments may have found their trump card in dealing with
the troublesome tribal claims to land and sovereignty.
But the opponents of tribal land claims may be too smart for their own good. The
dismissal of Indian land claims on the basis that too much time has passed since the
transactions in which Indian land ownership passed into the hands of non-Indians and
non-tribal governments may reduce state and local government liability, but the liability
could shift to the federal government. Thousands of Indian land claims involving millions
upon millions of acres now lay dormant, preserved in accordance with a 1982 federal
statute,419 waiting to be activated and prosecuted by the Department of Justice. Many, if
not the vast majority, of these land claims are based upon events that transpired long ago
and could be subject to the equitable defenses the City of Sherrill Court held could be
applied to “ancient” tribal claims. If these claims are barred by the passage of time, it will
be because of the failure of the United States to prosecute the land claims. As a result, the
United States will be liable to the Indian tribes who lost out on their land claims. Tens of
billions of dollars – and perhaps hundreds of billions of dollars – are at risk as a direct
result of the City of Sherrill and Cayuga Indian Nation cases.
Consider an older case. In 1968, the Supreme Court decided Menominee Tribe of
Indians v. United States.420 The posture of the case was most unusual in that both the
named parties – the Tribe and the Government – asked the Court to affirm a Court of
Claims ruling.421 The State of Wisconsin, appearing as amicus curiae, was the only party
arguing in favor of reversal.422 The case arose when Congress enacted the Menominee
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Termination Act of 1954, disbanding the tribal government and transferring the Tribe’s
assets to a private corporation owned and operated by the tribal members.423 Menominees
continued to exercise their hunting and fishing rights guaranteed by the 1854 Treaty of
Wolf River, however, and the State began to enforce its laws and regulations on them,
culminating in a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision holding that the 1954 termination act
had abrogated the 1854 treaty rights.424 The Tribe then turned to the federal claims courts
and sought just compensation under the Fifth Amendment against the United States for
the loss of the treaty-protected hunting and fishing rights. The Court of Claims held that
the Tribe wasn’t entitled to compensation because the treaty rights had not been
abrogated,425 leading to the unusual posture of the argument before the Supreme Court,
with the United States hoping to avoid liability by convincing the Court to strike down
the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision.
There are reasons to believe that same scenario could play out in the context of
Indian land claims barred by equitable defenses – and perhaps it will play out that way in
hundreds or even thousands of cases. First, in these cases, the basis for bringing a land
claim is a violation of a federal statute or an Indian treaty provision. The New York land
claims, for example, arise under the Trade and Intercourse Acts, where the federal
government had a duty to prevent – and if not prevent, then to seek a reversal of – the
underlying transactions leading to the land claims.426 In the case of land claims arising
out of treaty provisions, the claims are based on a treaty provision that places an
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affirmative mandate upon the federal government to prevent the dispossession of Indian
lands. In many, many circumstances, federal government officials participated in the acts
of dispossession – clear acts of illegality.427 Second, given that the federal government
often is the only party capable of suing to recover Indian lands or to seek compensation
because of state sovereign immunity,428 the equitable defense applies against the
government for failure to act. In effect, the federal government is at fault and therefore
culpable.429
Moreover, before any tribe can proceed with a claim under Section 2415, the
federal government must exercise discretion in determining whether or not to prosecute
the claim on behalf of the tribe.430 In other words, each Section 2415 claim places a strict
duty on the federal government. Since 1983, when the government published the land
claims in the Federal Register,431 the Department of Justice has chosen to take up only a
few.432 Over two decades have passed since the government published the land claims.
Given the harshness of the equity rules announced by federal courts, it may already be
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too late for the federal government to recover. Federal government liability may be
accruing this moment.

Conclusion
What remains of federal Indian law in Supreme Court jurisprudence? The
foundational principles that resonated with the Marshall, Warren, and Burger Courts have
not been persuasive to the Rehnquist or Roberts Courts. Given the Court’s unwillingness
to trace these foundational principles to the Constitution, it would appear that these
principles no longer carry the day. Did these principles ever carry the day in the Supreme
Court, even for the Courts that created and cemented them? Is “ruthless pragmatism” the
guiding principle of the Roberts Court’s Indian law cases? Perhaps federal Indian law is
dead, if it ever existed.
Observers of federal Indian law often chuckle when they read in Bob
Woodwards’ book The Brethren about how Supreme Court Justice Brennan once referred
to Antoine v. Washington,433 a 1975 case about the prosecution of a pair of Colville tribal
members, as a “chickenshit” case. Or how Justice Harlan referred to 1970’s Tooahnippah
v. Hickel 434 as a “peewee” case. Indian law advocates chuckle because, as Colorado Law
School dean David Getches has written, the Supreme Court accepts far more Indian law
cases for review than would be expected. In the 1997 and 2000 Terms, the Court heard
five Indian law cases, a remarkable percentage. On average, the Court has accepted
between two and four cases every year during the Rehnquist Court era, beginning in
1986. This number doesn’t seem particularly significant, until one considers that the
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number of the cases the Court heard in the 1985 Term – the last year of the Burger Court
– was about 160 cases and the caseload has been declining ever since. In the 2005 Term –
Chief Justice Roberts’ first year – the Court decided only 80 cases.
In 1991, H.W. Perry interviewed several Supreme Court Justices and some of
their former clerks in a study to determine what makes a case “certworthy,” or worthy
being granted certiorari. In Perry’s book, Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the
United States Supreme Court, one of the Justices, who identified him or herself as a
“Westerner,” referred to Indian law cases as “crud cases” worthy of assignment only to
junior Justices. But in the same breath, the Westerner Justice said, “Actually, I think the
Indian cases are kind of fascinating. It goes into history and you learn about it, and the
way we abused some of the Indians, we, that is the U.S. government….” That Justice
then noted that, in the Rehnquist Court, there were three Westerners and they all had a
special interest in western water law and in Indian law. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O’Connor are both from Arizona and Justice Kennedy is from California. Given
that the Supreme Court’s “Rule of Four” states that it takes the vote of four of the nine
Justices to grant certiorari in any given case, it would appear that in many Indian law
cases, the three Westerners needed only one more vote to grant “cert.” Perhaps this
helped to explain why the Court heard so many Indian law cases during the Rehnquist
Court era.
But Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor are no longer on the Court.
They’ve been replaced by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, neither of whom could
be called Westerners. The only Westerner Justice that remains is Justice Kennedy. Two
Indian law cases have been accepted this Term already, but upon closer reflection, one
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realizes they are not cases about federal Indian law principles, but rather are cases about
statutory interpretation and administrative law. In the 2005 Term, the Court heard only
one Indian law case, Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians – and that case had
been granted cert. during the 2004 Term when all three Westerners remained on the
Court.
Is Indian law no longer a favorite of Supreme Court certiorari decisions?
Consider the cases that the Roberts Court has refused to hear: (1) Cayuga Indian Nation
v. Pataki,435 where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals struck down Cayuga land claims
amounting to more than $200 million; (2) South Dakota v. Department of Interior 436 and
Utah v. Shivwits Band of Paiute Indians,437 two claims from states arguing that the
federal law allowing the Bureau of Indian Affairs to take land into trust for Indian tribes
was unconstitutional; and (3) Means v. Navajo Nation
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and Morris v. Tanner,439 two

cases arguing that the federal statute affirming that tribes have criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians was unconstitutional. While there were plausible reasons for the
Court to deny cert. in these cases, perhaps the sole Westerner remaining on the Court can
no longer garner the votes. For the eight non-Westerners on the Court, perhaps Indian law
simply isn’t “certworthy.” We’ll see how the Roberts Court develops. As many observers
know, the chief justice argued two Indian law cases before the Supreme Court – Alaska v.
Native Village of Venetie
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Country – so we know he is knowledgeable about some aspects of Indian law. One
question yet to be answered is whether the Chief Justice transforms his professional
expertise and experience in federal Indian law questions into votes for certiorari.
Regardless, Indian law might be dead after all. The principles that guided the
Court over the first 200 years of its Indian law jurisprudence are shadows of their former
selves. And, with the decline in the Court’s docket, there are fewer and fewer cases that
attract the Court’s constitutional interest in a way that would allow tribal advocates to roll
back some of the decisions disfavoring tribal interests.

Miigwetch.
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